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Executive summary 
There is considerable technical potential for improving industrial energy efficiency and the economics 
appear favourable, even without putting a price on carbon emissions. Such improvements frequently 
involve the adoption of established technologies whose performance is well proven and which involve 
relatively little technical risk. However, it has long been recognised that numerous ‘barriers’ inhibit 
the adoption of such technologies, such as lack of information, shortage of trained personnel and 
limited access to capital. In particular, the adoption of such technologies may be associated with 
various ‘hidden costs’ that are difficult to capture within energy-economic models. But while there is 
a general consensus that an energy efficiency ‘gap’ exists, and that policy options to overcome this 
gap need to be identified and acted upon, there is considerable debate over the most effective 
approach.  
 
This report has been prepared as background to the to the proposed UNIDO report “If industrial 
energy efficiency pays, why is it not happening?” The objectives are to: identify the nature, operation 
and determinants of different barriers to the adoption of energy efficient technologies in industry; 
assess the prevalence and relative importance of these barriers in different contexts; and provide a 
springboard to determine where to most effectively address policy efforts. A companion report 
examines policy options for developing countries in more detail (Mallett, et al., 2010). 
 
This report is based upon earlier work by Sorrell et al. (2004), together with a review of 160 recent 
studies of energy efficiency drawn from both the academic and ‘grey’ literature. The focus throughout 
is upon energy efficiency in the industrial sector, although some of the studies also include the public 
and commercial sectors. The report includes quantitative summaries of the results of these studies, 
together with more detailed examination of those studies which evaluate the relative importance of 
barriers. Full details of the studies reviewed are contained in an Access database which is available on 
request.  
 
Main findings 
The concept of a barrier to energy efficiency is both confused and contested. Although the term is 
widely used, there is little consensus on how barriers should be understood, how important they are in 
different contexts, and how (if at all) they should be addressed. Many authors distinguish between 
barriers and market failures and recognise that some provide no grounds for policy intervention while 
others may prove too costly to overcome. However, this perspective tends to treat market failures as 
absolute, whereas in practice they are relative. It also tends to ignore barriers which are internal to 
organizations and adopts an unrealistic model of individual rationality.  
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The classification of barriers to energy efficiency used in this report draws upon orthodox, transaction 
cost and behavioural economics and is summarized in Table E.1. It is argued that the barriers are to 
some extent interdependent and may manifest themselves in a number of different ways (e.g., 
technical versus market risk). Also, the relative importance of each barrier may vary between different 
technologies and organizations and several are likely to coexist.  
Table E.1   A taxonomy of barriers to energy efficiency 
Barrier Claim 
Risk The short paybacks required for energy efficiency investments may represent a 
rational response to risk. This could be because energy efficiency investments 
represent a higher technical or financial risk than other types of investment, or that 
business and market uncertainty encourages short time horizons 
 
Imperfect 
information 
Lack of information on energy efficiency opportunities may lead to cost-effective 
opportunities being missed. In some cases, imperfect information may lead to 
inefficient products driving efficient products out of the market. 
 
Hidden costs Engineering-economic analyses may fail to account for either the reduction in 
utility associated with energy efficient technologies, or the additional costs 
associated with them. As a consequence, the studies may overestimate energy 
efficiency potential. Examples of hidden costs include overhead costs for 
management, disruptions to production, staff replacement and training, and the 
costs associated with gathering, analysing and applying information. 
 
Access to 
capital  
If an organization has insufficient capital through internal funds, and has difficulty 
raising additional funds through borrowing or share issues, energy efficient 
investments may be prevented from going ahead. Investment could also be 
inhibited by internal capital budgeting procedures, investment appraisal rules and 
the short-term incentives of energy management staff.  
 
Split 
incentives 
Energy efficiency opportunities are likely to be foregone if actors cannot 
appropriate the benefits of the investment. For example, if individual departments 
within an organization are not accountable for their energy use they will have no 
incentive to improve energy efficiency 
 
Bounded 
rationality 
Owing to constraints on time, attention, and the ability to process information, 
individuals do not make decisions in the manner assumed in economic models. As 
a consequence, they may neglect opportunities for improving energy efficiency, 
even when given good information and appropriate incentives. 
 
 
 
Despite the lack of rigour and consistency in the empirical literature, the following general 
conclusions may be drawn: 
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Hidden costs are real, significant and form the primary explanation for the ‘efficiency gap’. These 
costs frequently outweigh the potential saving in energy costs - especially in SMEs with low energy 
intensity. What remains in dispute is the extent to which such costs may be cost-effectively reduced 
by organizational initiatives, public policy or a combination of the two. This issue needs to be 
resolved by more rigorous research that includes comparative studies of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ performers. 
 
The neglect of energy efficiency opportunities is overdetermined: Hidden costs generally coexist 
alongside one or more of the other barriers in our taxonomy, with the result that the neglect of energy 
efficiency opportunities becomes overdetermined. Hence, the key issue is not so much the relative 
importance of different barriers, but their cumulative effect. Initiatives to encourage cost effective 
investments will need to understand and address several aspects of the problem if they are to be 
successful. 
 
Barriers to energy efficiency in developing countries are similar to those in developed countries, but 
more pronounced. Problems of lack of information and skills are widespread in developing countries 
and inadequately addressed through public policy, and difficulties in accessing capital are very 
common, especially for smaller firms. While this is partly a consequence of hidden costs, it tends to 
be exacerbated by the deficiencies of the financial sector, including more limited knowledge of 
technical risks and opportunities combined with trade and investment policies that restrict access to 
foreign capital. These problems should be a priority for reform, alongside the removal of energy 
subsidies which undermine the economic case for improved energy efficiency. 
 
A targeted policy mix is required. Barriers to energy efficiency are multi-faceted, diverse and often 
specific to individual technologies and sectors. This implies that effective policy solutions will need to 
address the particular features of individual energy service markets, the circumstances of different 
types of energy-using organization, and the multiple barriers to energy efficiency within each. It is 
likely that a mix of policies will be required, in which several different initiatives work together in 
synergy. The basic elements of this mix are well-established and include best practice schemes, 
demonstration projects, training initiatives, market-based instruments, labelling schemes and 
minimum standards for the energy efficiency of equipment. The costs and benefits of these individual 
instruments will require careful analysis, as will the overall coherence of the mix. But to date, 
researchers have paid too much attention to modelling what could be achieved and too little attention 
to evaluating what policy has (or has not) achieved - and why. Hence, much greater priority needs to 
be given to policy evaluation.  
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1 Introduction 
There is considerable technical potential for improving industrial energy efficiency and the economics 
appear favourable, even without putting a price on carbon emissions (IPCC, 2008). Such 
improvements frequently involve the adoption of established technologies whose performance is well 
proven and which involve relatively little technical risk. Many studies suggest that these technologies 
are highly cost-effective, with risk-adjusted rates of return greatly exceeding the anticipated cost of 
capital (Geller, et al., 2006; IPCC, 2008; Krause, 1996; Lovins and Lovins, 1997). Even greater 
savings can be realised in developing countries where old, inefficient technologies are commonly 
used. Savings may also be made through optimising system design and improving operational and 
maintenance procedures while many technologies have productivity benefits that extend well beyond 
energy-saving (Worrell, et al., 2003). 
 
However, numerous ‘barriers’ inhibit the adoption of such technologies, such as lack of information, 
shortage of trained personnel and limited access to capital. In particular, various ‘hidden costs’ can 
make such technologies more costly than they first appear. But while there is a general consensus that 
an energy efficiency ‘gap’ exists, and that policy options to overcome this gap need to be identified 
and acted upon (Brown, 2001), there is considerable debate over the most effective approach.  
 
This report has been prepared as background to the to the proposed UNIDO report “If industrial 
energy efficiency pays, why is it not happening?” The UNIDO report seeks to make the case that: i) a 
variety of barriers prevent industry from adopting cost-effective energy efficient technologies, ii) 
these barriers can be overcome through a variety of policy interventions; and iii) the potential of these 
interventions has yet to be fully explored in developing countries. 
 
The objectives of this background report are to: identify the nature, operation and determinants of 
different barriers to the adoption of energy efficient technologies in industry; assess the prevalence 
and relative importance of these barriers in different contexts (particularly industrialised versus 
developing countries; energy-intensive versus non-energy-intensive industries; and Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) versus large companies); through this exercise, provide a springboard to 
determine where to most effectively address policy efforts.  
 
The report builds upon an earlier study of barriers to energy efficiency by Sorrell et al. (2004). It 
seeks to update this by summarizing the results of more recent literature, focusing in particular upon 
studies from developing countries. The report reviews both academic and ‘grey’ literature concerning 
energy efficiency in industry, paying particular attention to those few studies that use either statistical 
analysis or case study research to establish the relative importance of different barriers.  
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The structure of the report is as follows. Section 2 provides some basic definitions and summarizes 
the approach taken, including how the empirical literature was identified and classified. Section 3 
describes the nature and operation of six different barriers to energy efficiency in some detail, using a 
taxonomy developed by Sorrell et al. (2004). This taxonomy has since been widely employed in the 
empirical literature (Masselink, 2007; Rohdin, et al., 2007) and many of the most commonly cited 
barriers to energy efficiency can be interpreted within this framework. Section 4 summarizes the main 
findings from the empirical literature, including the most commonly cited barriers to energy 
efficiency and how these vary from one context to another. Section 5 looks in more detail at a sample 
of studies that attempt to rank the relative importance of different barriers, using either surveys or case 
study research. A key finding from both these sections is that multiple barriers to energy efficiency 
coexist and reinforce one another and that these barriers are interdependent. This and related 
conclusions are summarized in Section 6. 
 
2 Methods and approach  
This report is based upon earlier work by Sorrell et al. (2004), together with a review of 160 more 
recent studies of energy efficiency drawn from both the academic and ‘grey’ literature. Most of these 
studies were published after 2000 and therefore coincide with a period of intensifying global concern 
about climate change and rapidly rising emissions from industrializing economies such as China and 
India. The focus throughout is upon energy efficiency in the industrial sector, although some of the 
studies also include the public and commercial sectors. The report includes quantitative summaries of 
the results of these studies, together with more detailed examination of those studies which evaluate 
the relative importance of barriers. Full details of the studies reviewed are contained in an Access 
database which is available on request. This section provides some relevant definitions and 
summarizes the approach taken. 
 
2.1 Key definitions 
Energy efficiency 
The term energy efficiency is widely used but not always well understood. It may be defined as the 
ratio of useful outputs to energy inputs for a system, where the latter may be an individual energy 
conversion device (e.g., a boiler), a building, an industrial process, a firm, a sector or an entire 
economy. In all cases, the measure of energy efficiency will depend upon how ‘useful’ is defined and 
how inputs and outputs are measured (Patterson, 1996). The options include: 
Thermodynamic measures: where the outputs are defined in terms of either heat content or the 
capacity to perform useful work; 
Physical measures: where the outputs are defined in physical terms, such as vehicle kilometres or 
tonnes of steel; or 
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Economic measures: where the outputs (and sometimes also the inputs) are defined in economic 
terms, such as value-added or GDP. 
 
When outputs are measured in thermodynamic or physical terms, the term energy efficiency tends to 
be used, but when outputs are measured in economic terms it is more common to use the term ‘energy 
productivity’. The inverse of both measures is termed ‘energy intensity’. The choice of measures for 
inputs and outputs, the appropriate system boundaries and the timeframe under consideration can vary 
widely. However, physical and economic measures of energy efficiency tend to be influenced by a 
greater range of variables than thermodynamic measures, as do measures appropriate to wider system 
boundaries.  
 
Economists are primarily interested in energy efficiency improvements that are consistent with the 
best use of all economic resources. These are conventionally divided into two categories: those that 
are associated with improvements in overall, or ‘total factor’ productivity (‘technical change’), and 
those that are not (‘substitution’). The latter is assumed to be induced by changes in the price of 
energy relative to other inputs. The consequences of technical change are of particular interest, since 
this contributes to the growth in economic output. However, distinguishing empirically between these 
two categories can be challenging, not least because changes in relative prices also induce technical 
change. 
 
End uses 
Energy consumption in the industrial sector is commonly classified as either process or generic. The 
former refers to energy used directly in the production process, whereas the latter refers to energy 
used for non-core applications such as heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), lighting and 
information technology. However, the boundary between these two categories is not always clear.  
 
Process applications dominate overall industrial energy consumption and include compressed air, 
pumping, and fan systems (referred to collectively as motor systems), steam systems and high- and 
low-temperature process heat (Table 2.1). The main high-temperature process uses of energy are coke 
ovens, blast furnaces and other furnaces and kilns, while low-temperature process uses include 
process heating and distillation in the chemicals sector; baking and separation processes in the food 
and drink sector; pressing and drying processes in paper manufacture; and washing, scouring, dyeing 
and drying in textiles (DTI, 2002). Motor systems are used for pumping, fans, machinery drives, 
compressors (for both compressed air supply and for refrigeration) and conveyors, with refrigeration 
being especially important in the food and drink sector. 
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Different industrial sectors vary widely in their energy intensity, fuel mix and split between different 
end uses (Table 2.1 and Table 2.2) give illustrative data for the UK). High-temperature process heat is 
concentrated in the iron and steel, non-ferrous metal, bricks, cement, glass and ceramic sectors. Low-
temperature process heat is the largest end use in food, drink and tobacco; while space heating and 
lighting are dominant in the engineering sector.  
 
Table 2.1  UK industrial energy consumption by end use (1999) 
Category  Share of total 
Low temperature process heat 30% 
High-temperature process heat 25% 
Drying and separation 11% 
Space heating 10% 
Motor systems 8% 
Other 16% 
 
Table 2.2  UK industrial energy consumption by sector (2001) 
Category Share of total 
Chemicals 22% 
Food, drink and tobacco 12% 
Iron and steel 10% 
Mineral products 7% 
Paper, print and publishing 6% 
Mechanical engineering 5% 
Vehicles 5% 
Other industry 33% 
Source: (DTI, 2002) 
 
Barriers to energy efficiency 
Following Sorrell et al (2004), a barrier to energy efficiency is defined here as “a postulated 
mechanism that inhibits a decision or behaviour that appears to be both energy efficient and 
economically efficient.” 
 
Although a widely used concept, barriers to energy efficiency are classified in multiple and 
overlapping ways in the literature which makes the comparison of different studies extremely 
problematic.  
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There are numerous lenses through which to examine potential barriers to energy efficiency. While 
most studies use economic concepts (including orthodox, transaction cost and behavioural 
economics), the concept of barriers can also be approached from the perspective of social psychology 
(Palmer, 2009) on organizational theory (Montalvo, 2008; Sorrell, 2000c). Some authors (e.g., Foxon, 
2003) favor a systems perspective, whereby barriers and ways to overcome them are addressed at the 
macro-level. Such system-level barriers include carbon lock-in, dominant design, network effects, and 
path dependent technological trajectories. An economics based framework is used here as, first, the 
majority of literature reviewed uses this approach; and second, the primary focus of the UNIDO 
report is the profitability of energy efficiency investments.  
 
The taxonomy used in this report is summarized in Table 2.3 and discussed in detail in Section 3. The 
taxonomy is based upon categories that are widely used within the energy efficiency literature, 
although the description and evaluation of these barriers in Section 3 draws upon more formal ideas, 
such as asymmetric information. The taxonomy covers most of the factors that are commonly claimed 
to inhibit investment in energy efficiency and although different studies may classify barriers in 
different ways; these can frequently be reinterpreted in terms of the categories in Table 2.3.  
 
However, some studies highlight additional factors which are not included in Table 2.3 –such as the 
absence of government support for energy efficiency. Many of these do not qualify as barriers as 
defined above since they do not explain why a technology that is both energy and economically 
efficient has not been adopted. However, they frequently highlight important contextual factors which 
help explain why other barriers to energy efficiency have not been overcome (e.g., information 
deficits) and why the energy intensity of an industrial sector in one country is much greater than the 
corresponding sector in another. This applies in particular to the differing conditions within developed 
and developing countries. 
 
Each of the barriers may be considered a hypothesis that potentially explains the neglect of energy 
efficiency within organizational decisions. But as discussed in Section 3, each of these barriers may 
have a number of contributory mechanisms and several of these mechanisms can coexist in different 
situations.  
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Table 2.3 A taxonomy of barriers to energy efficiency 
Barrier Claim 
Risk The short paybacks required for energy efficiency investments may represent a 
rational response to risk. This could be because energy efficiency investments 
represent a higher technical or financial risk than other types of investment, or that 
business and market uncertainty encourages short time horizons. 
 
Imperfect 
information 
Lack of information on energy efficiency opportunities may lead to cost-effective 
opportunities being missed. In some cases, imperfect information may lead to 
inefficient products driving efficient products out of the market. 
 
Hidden costs Engineering-economic analyses may fail to account for either the reduction in utility 
associated with energy efficient technologies, or the additional costs associated with 
them. As a consequence, the studies may overestimate energy efficiency potential. 
Examples of hidden costs include overhead costs for management, disruptions to 
production, staff replacement and training, and the costs associated with gathering, 
analysing and applying information. 
 
Access to 
capital  
If an organization has insufficient capital through internal funds, and has difficulty 
raising additional funds through borrowing or share issues, energy efficient 
investments may be prevented from going ahead. Investment could also be inhibited 
by internal capital budgeting procedures, investment appraisal rules and the short-term 
incentives of energy management staff.  
 
Split 
incentives 
Energy efficiency opportunities are likely to be foregone if actors cannot appropriate 
the benefits of the investment. For example, if individual departments within an 
organization are not accountable for their energy use they will have no incentive to 
improve energy efficiency. 
 
Bounded 
rationality 
Owing to constraints on time, attention, and the ability to process information, 
individuals do not make decisions in the manner assumed in economic models. As a 
consequence, they may neglect opportunities for improving energy efficiency, even 
when given good information and appropriate incentives. 
 
 
Other definitions 
Other definitions relevant to the subject of this report are as follows: 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are defined as any enterprise with less than 250 employees 
(European Commission 2005).  
 
Industrialised’ nations are defined as high income members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). This includes Japan, Korea, the United States, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand and 21 European countries. Three low income OECD members, Poland, 
Turkey and Mexico are excluded from this definition.  
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Emerging economies are defined as Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico, China and South Korea. These are 
sometimes referred to as middle income countries or the BRIC group of countries.1 
 
Industrial sectors are commonly categorised as either energy-intensive or non energy-intensive on the 
basis (usually) of the percentage of input costs accounted for by energy. However, there is no standard 
definition and the categorisation varies from one study to another. As far as possible, this report uses 
the categorisation summarized in Table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.4  Energy-intensive versus non-intensive sectors 
Energy-intensive Non-intensive 
Cement,  
Automotive,  
Paper & Pulp,  
Aerospace,  
Shipping,  
Chemicals,  
Petrochemical,  
Pharmaceuticals,  
Refineries,  
Metals,  
Construction 
Baking,  
Food & Drink,  
Glass,  
ICT,  
Agriculture,  
Commercial,  
Textiles,  
Wood manufacture 
 
 
2.2 Scope and data collection 
In compiling this report, we have reviewed a total of 65 academic studies and 95 studies from the 
‘grey’ literature. This sample is substantial and representative, but is not intended to be 
comprehensive. Academic studies were selected via keyword search, which directed attention 
predominantly to specialist journals, including: Energy Policy, Energy for Sustainable Development, 
Energy, Energy Economics, Journal of Cleaner Production, Resource and Energy Economics, 
Applied Energy, as well as relevant academic books. The sources for the grey literature search reflect 
the recommendations of experts in the field and include: the European Council for an Energy Efficient 
Economy (ECEEE), the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE), the Lawrence 
Berkeley National Labs (LBNL), the US Department of Energy (USDOE), the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
                                                 
1
 The term Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico and China (BRICs), stem from a 2001 and later 2003 Goldman Sachs report where 
these four countries were singled out in forecast scenarios to account for the majority of global GDP, economic growth and 
investment opportunities by 2050. In a 2005 Goldman Sachs paper, Mexico was also projected to have rates similar to the 
rest of these countries (O’Neill et al. 2005: 4), leading to the term BRIMCs. (This was further updated to include South 
Korea – BRIMCK in 2007) (O’Neill 2007); 
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the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP), the UK Carbon Trust and 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Inevitably, many more grey studies 
could be added, notably those produced primarily for audiences within particular industrial sectors. 
Our sample includes a group of reports relating to the cement industry as an illustration of the depth of 
information available at the sector level. Cement was chosen as an energy-intensive sector with a 
developed set of negotiated agreements and initiatives for energy efficiency monitoring and reporting.  
 
The majority of grey studies (67 percent of n=95) and half of the academic studies (33 percent of 
n=66) relate to industrialized countries. The remainder relate to either developing countries, both 
developed and developing countries, or discuss general trends without reference to particular regions 
(for example, focusing on technology rather than context). To facilitate analysis, the key features and 
findings of these studies have been summarized within an Access database (available on request). The 
studies were categorized according to country/region, industrial sector(s) covered, size of firm (large 
or SME) and ownership (public versus private). The main findings of each study were briefly 
summarized, including those relevant to barriers to energy efficiency.  
 
The 160 studies were grouped into five categories, as illustrated in Table 2.5. The studies ranged from 
technology-focused estimates of the benefits of selected energy efficiency technologies through to 
empirical ‘in use’ case studies, best practice recommendations, and policy recommendations and 
evaluation. Some studies were classified under more than one category since they met more than one 
of the descriptions indicated in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5  Type of study  
Category Description 
Technological proposal  Provides quantified estimates of the energy-saving benefits of 
adopting particular technologies or processes. 
Market scoping study Collates descriptive and/or quantitative data on the existing use of 
technologies, processes and energy in particular sectors and/or 
regions. May in some cases provide estimates of potential energy 
savings through adoption of energy efficient technologies.  
Regional case studies  Analyses the implementation of a technology or process, or its 
potential for energy efficiency, in a particular country or region. 
Best practice of sector or firm Recommends best practice drawn from empirical research of firms 
in a particular sector 
Policy proposal or evaluation Recommends policy options and/or evaluates impact of existing 
policy on energy efficiency.  
 
 
 
 9 
Most of the analysis in this report is based upon two subsets of the data: 
Empirical studies: 64 of the studies (40 percent of the total) were classified as ‘empirical’ in that they 
included primary data gathered directly from interviews and surveys or from the meta-analysis of 
other studies. It was this subset of studies that provided information on barriers to energy efficiency, 
although the nature, amount and quality of this information varied widely from one study to another. 
The barriers to energy efficiency identified and discussed in these studies were categorised as far as 
possible according to the taxonomy indicated in Table 2.3. This necessarily involved some judgment, 
since most of the studies did not use the same taxonomy as in Table 2.3. For each of these studies, we 
highlighted the three barriers that appeared to be the ‘most prominent’. This was an impressionistic 
exercise, since the majority of studies did not indicate the relative importance of different barriers. 
This imprecision should be borne in mind when interpreting the quantitative results in Section 4. 
 
Detailed studies: Seven of the studies were especially useful in that they attempted to identify the 
relative importance of different barriers to energy efficiency. This was achieved either through the 
econometric analysis of survey data (e.g., Schleich, 2009) or (more usually) from the less formal 
analysis of interview data (e.g., Hasanbeigi, et al., 2009). The results of these studies are summarized 
and compared in Section 5. 
 
In addition to recording the findings on barriers to energy efficiency, note was also made of broader 
contextual factors, such as policy environments, sector norms and other constraints that, while 
operating outside the influence of individual firms, could nevertheless impede (or at least fail to 
encourage) their adoption of energy efficiency measures.  
 
2.3 Overview of data collected 
Our sample of studies suggests there has been a shift in research activity over time, from the relatively 
narrow quantification of potential savings linked to specific technologies towards more empirically-
based studies to determine the circumstances in which these technologies are or are not implemented. 
Many of the empirically-based studies in our sample focus explicitly on barriers to adoption in both 
developed and developing country contexts (e.g., Coito, et al., 2005; CSI, 2007; D'Antonio, et al., 
2005; Helgerud and Sandbakk, 2009; Koizumi, 2007; Motegi and Watson, 2005). Meanwhile, 
traditional sources of energy efficiency innovation, such as equipment vendors, university engineering 
departments and research institutes, highlight and quantify new sources of potential energy savings in 
a sector context (e.g., Dupont and Sapora, 2009; Lezsovits, 2009; NRC, 2006). 
 
Table 2.6 and Figure 2.1 provide a breakdown of the sample by study type (see Table 2.5) and 
industrial sector. Many of the studies span more than one of the categories identified in Table 2.5, so 
the total row of Table 2.6 exceeds the number of studies. Studies providing best practice 
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recommendations form the largest group, followed by regional case studies. These studies may 
mention barriers to adoption but the main objective is to present cumulative case study evidence for 
the benefits of particular technical options. Research in the form of technological proposals tends to 
focus on generic benefits rather than examining the practical implementation issues in specific 
sectors. Policy recommendations and evaluation tend to focus on broad areas of ‘industry’ and 
‘manufacturing’, rather than specific sectors.  
 
The categorization of studies by sector in Table 2.6 is non-exclusive. For example, a study may 
examine the application of a cross-cutting technology in one or more energy-intensive sectors, or in 
industry generally. Similarly, a single study may be of more than one type – for example, a case study 
may focus on a sector in a particular country or region.  
 
Table 2.6 Classification of studies by type and industrial sector (n=160) 
Study type No of studies Cross-cutting Energy-
intensive3 
Non 
energy-
intensive 
General4 
Technological proposal  54 21 9 6 18 
Market scoping study 10 1 2 4 3 
Regional case studies  56 15 15 3 23 
Best practice of sector or firm 75 13 25 14 23 
Policy proposal or evaluation 40 9 2 4 25 
Total studies1 235 59 53 31 92 
1Total number of studies is >160 as each study (n=160) can be categorized by multiple study types 
2
 Cross cutting technologies are those with generic applications in multiple sectors. Examples include motors, 
fans, compressors, heat recovery and insulation.  
4
‘General refers to studies that address a range of sectors described generically as either ‘industrial’ or 
‘manufacturing’.  
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Figure 2.1  Prevalence of study type as percentage of total  
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3 A taxonomy of barriers to energy efficiency 
This section describes the nature and operation of six different barriers to energy efficiency in some 
detail, using a taxonomy developed by Sorrell et al. (2004). Each of the barriers represents a potential 
answer to one or more of the following questions: 
• Why do organizations impose very stringent investment criteria for projects to improve 
energy efficiency?  
• Why do organizations neglect projects that appear to meet these criteria? 
• Why do organizations neglect energy efficient and apparently cost-effective alternatives when 
making broader investment, operational, maintenance and purchasing decisions? 
Section 3.1 introduces three different perspectives on barriers to energy efficiency, clarifies the 
distinction between barriers and market failures, introduces a taxonomy of six barriers to energy 
efficiency and makes some observations on how these may be identified. The subsequent sections 
discuss the nature, operation and consequences of each of these barriers in some detail. Section 3.8 
summarizes some contextual issues that should also be taken into consideration, while Section 3.9 
concludes. 
 
3.1 Perspectives on barriers 
Underlying the debate on barriers to energy efficiency are competing assumptions about the nature of 
human rationality, the appropriate role of markets and the relative usefulness of different approaches 
to understanding economic behaviour. Scepticism about ‘no regrets’ opportunities derives largely 
from orthodox economics, which considers that policy intervention is only justified where the 
existence of market failures - such as asymmetric information - can clearly be demonstrated and 
where the benefits of intervention outweigh the costs. Orthodox economics relies upon highly 
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formalised mathematical models and unrealistic assumptions about human decision-making. In 
contrast, transaction cost economics (TCE) assumes that individuals make satisfactory rather than 
optimal decisions and rely heavily on routines and rules of thumb (Furubotn and Richter, 1997; 
Simon, 1959; Williamson, 1985). Behavioural economics takes these arguments one stage further by 
arguing that decision-making is not just ‘boundedly rational’ but systematically biased and erroneous 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994). For example, individuals commonly 
exhibit ‘loss-aversion’ and a ‘status quo bias’ which can discourage them from undertaking cost-
effective investments - such as the manager who declined to pursue a project with a 50-50 chance of 
either making $300k or losing $60k (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Swalm, 1966; Thaler, 1991). 
Experimental tests suggest that such biases are universal, predictable and largely unaffected by either 
monetary incentives or learning (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000).  
 
Studies of barriers to energy efficiency vary greatly in the extent to which they employ these ideas. 
Some discuss barriers with minimal reference to formal theory; some draw upon orthodox ideas but 
reject transaction cost and behavioural economics (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994),2 and some make 
reference to concepts such as transaction costs, but do not develop their full implications (Sanstad and 
Howarth, 1994). The situation is further complicated by the blurring of boundaries between different 
approaches. Not only is there a great deal of overlap between these different perspectives, but the 
concepts used in the barriers debate frequently subsume more than one concept from these different 
traditions and refer to phenomena that can be explained by (and may well be caused by) more than 
one mechanism. The contribution of these different theoretical perspectives is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
 
                                                 
2
 Although the founders of transaction cost economics (Oliver Williamson) and behavioural economics (Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky) have both been awarded the Nobel Prize. 
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Figure 3.1  Perspectives on barriers to energy efficiency 
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In determining the barriers to cost-effective energy efficiency improvements, an important 
consideration is whether these provide suitable grounds for policy intervention. For example, 
managers’ informed assessment of local conditions may undermine the business case for investment, 
but the relevant costs may be ‘hidden’ in that they are not readily visible from outside the firm or 
sector. From the perspective of orthodox economics, these ‘hidden costs’ are not an appropriate focus 
for policy intervention since they do not constitute a market failure. Instead, the firm is assumed to be 
behaving rationally, given the risk-adjusted rate of return on an investment in the existing context of 
energy, capital and ‘hidden’ costs (which are assumed to be fixed). But from the perspective of 
transaction cost economics, such costs may be an appropriate focus of policy intervention since they 
could potentially be reduced by policy measures such as information programmes. From this 
perspective, hidden costs are not fixed, but depend instead upon the particular market, organizational 
and contractual arrangements. These in turn are amenable to change through organizational initiatives, 
public policy or a combination of the two.  
 
Empirically identifying barriers to energy efficiency in different contexts is far from straightforward. 
The energy efficiency of a firm is influenced by multiple decisions taken at multiple levels, including 
strategic planning, budgeting, operations, maintenance, purchasing and so on. For example, the 
imposition of relatively high discount rates may provide a significant barrier to energy efficiency 
projects, but the underlying question is why such constraints are chosen. Hence, to accurately identify 
barriers to energy efficiency requires detailed insights into the firm’s rules, procedures, incentives and 
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routines. An additional challenge is that the researcher must analyse an historical phenomenon that 
hinges on decisions that were not taken. Detailed and time-consuming primary research is therefore 
required, involving either surveys of a large number of firms or case studies of a smaller number. The 
theoretical framework used to guide this research is of crucial importance and the existing literature if 
frequently weak, both in terms of its identification and description of relevant concepts (barriers) and 
in the methods used to identify the existence of those barriers (see Sorrell, et al. (2004) for a 
discussion). The result is a confused and methodologically weak set of studies from which relatively 
little consensus has emerged.  
 
The six barriers used in this study are summarized in Table 3.1. The following sections discuss the 
nature, operation and consequences of each of these barriers in turn. 
 
Table 3.1 A taxonomy of barriers to energy efficiency 
Barrier Claim 
Risk The short paybacks required for energy efficiency investments may represent a rational 
response to risk. This could be because such investments represent a higher technical or 
financial risk than other types of investment, or that business and market uncertainty 
encourages short time horizons. 
 
Imperfect 
information 
Lack of information on energy efficiency opportunities may lead to cost-effective 
opportunities being missed. In some cases, imperfect information may lead to inefficient 
products driving efficient products out of the market. 
Hidden costs Engineering-economic analyses may fail to account for either the reduction in utility 
associated with energy efficient technologies, or the additional costs associated with 
them. As a consequence, the studies may overestimate energy efficiency potential. 
Examples of hidden costs include overhead costs for management, disruptions to 
production, staff replacement and training, and the costs associated with gathering, 
analysing and applying information. 
 
Access to 
capital  
If an organization has insufficient capital through internal funds, and has difficulty 
raising additional funds through borrowing or share issues, energy efficient investments 
may be prevented from going ahead. Investment could also be inhibited by internal 
capital budgeting procedures, investment appraisal rules and the short-term incentives of 
energy management staff.  
 
Split 
incentives 
Energy efficiency opportunities are likely to be foregone if actors cannot appropriate the 
benefits of the investment. For example, if individual departments within an 
organization are not accountable for their energy use they will have no incentive to 
improve energy efficiency. 
 
Bounded 
rationality 
Owing to constraints on time, attention, and the ability to process information, 
individuals do not make decisions in the manner assumed in economic models. As a 
consequence, they may neglect energy efficiency opportunities, even when given good 
information and appropriate incentives.  
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3.2 Risk 
Both high discount rates for energy efficiency investments and the rejection of particular energy 
efficient technologies may represent a rational response to risk. For example, if there is doubt that a 
business will survive over the next three years, stringent investment criteria may be entirely 
appropriate. Risk may derive from a range of sources, including overall economic trends (e.g., 
inflation, interest rates), potential changes in government policy, trends in input and output markets 
(e.g., fuel and electricity prices), financing risk (e.g., the anticipated reaction of capital markets to 
increases in borrowing), and the technical risks associated with individual technologies (e.g., 
unreliability). These risks may be expected to vary with the individual country, sector, business and 
technology and to change over time. Furthermore, perceptions of risk by the relevant decision-makers 
may depart from those suggested by economic models (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). 
 
While risk is multidimensional, what matters for the barriers debate is the potential impact of real or 
perceived risks on energy efficiency investment, as opposed to other forms of investment. In other 
words, are there any reasons why energy efficiency investments or energy efficient alternatives should 
carry a higher risk than other forms of investment, and therefore be systematically overlooked?  
 
The first possibility is that energy efficient technologies are subject to greater technical risks. For 
example, if technology is (or is perceived to be) unreliable, the risk of breakdowns and disruptions 
may outweigh any potential benefits from reduced energy costs. Such risks are particularly associated 
with new and unfamiliar technologies and these are commonly the subject of government funded 
demonstration programmes which aim to increase confidence and disseminate information and 
awareness among potential adopters. However, many of the technologies that are included in 
engineering-economic models and recommended in energy efficiency publications are well proven, 
reliable and widely used. These include, for example, energy efficient lighting, condensing boilers, 
thermal insulation, energy efficient motors, thermostatic radiator valves and lighting controls. In most 
applications the technical risk associated with these technologies appears to be small. Hence, unless 
perceptions diverge significantly from reality, technical risk seems unlikely to provide a reason for 
their rejection in the majority of cases.  
 
A second possibility, suggested by Sutherland (1991), is that energy efficiency investments require 
higher hurdle rates because they are ‘illiquid’ and irreversible, with limited scope for diversifying 
risks. The comparison here is with investments in financial instruments, such as stocks and bonds, 
which are highly liquid since they can be easily bought and sold (Golove and Eto, 1996; Johnson, 
1994). In comparison, energy efficiency investments are normally embedded within buildings and 
equipment, costly to remove and with limited scope for subsequent resale. Since they must generally 
be retained, regardless of their performance, they carry a greater risk than investment in other types of 
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assets which suggests that the value of future benefits should be discounted more highly. But while 
this argument may account for the differing treatment of ‘liquid’ and ‘illiquid’ assets, it fails to 
account for the differing treatment of comparable assets. For example, why should cost saving energy 
efficiency investments be subject to more stringent investment criteria than investment in new 
production plant, when the latter is equally illiquid and irreversible? The scope of this argument may 
therefore be limited. 
 
Hasset and Metcalf (1993) and Johnson (1994) present a similar argument to Sutherland, which is 
based on the concept of ‘real options theory’ (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). They argue that the 
combination of uncertainty in the future course of energy prices, capital costs and technical change, 
coupled with the irreversibility of energy efficiency investments leads to an optimal rate of return 
which is higher than conventional investment models predict. One reason for this is that there is an 
opportunity cost in acting today, rather than delaying the decision and resolving some uncertainties. 
The possibility of delaying the decision represents an option, which has a value in proportion to the 
degree of uncertainty on investment returns. But since this option is no longer available once the 
investment has been made, the full cost of the investment should include the cost of foreclosing the 
option. This leads to a testable implication that required rates of return should be positively correlated 
with the degree of uncertainty of future returns (Metcalf, 1994).  
 
Sanstad et al (1995) have criticised the Hasset and Metcalf model on three grounds. First, it fails by 
some distance to account for the observed discount rates for energy efficiency investments. They 
demonstrate that the ‘option value multiplier’ in Hasset and Metcalf’s model falls off rapidly as the 
assumed discount rate increases, and has only a limited effect on the required rate of return (e.g., 
increasing from 15 percent to 17.4 percent). Second, the model fails to account for the potential costs 
of delaying energy efficiency investments (Howarth and Sanstad, 1995). For example, it is much more 
costly to retrofit heat recovery systems than to include them when a plant or building is designed. 
Since most decisions relevant to energy efficiency involve a choice between efficient and inefficient 
options within an investment that is being made for other purposes, the scope of the model is seriously 
circumscribed. Third, the model has the usual limitations of orthodox theory in that it assumes 
investors are fully informed about relevant alternatives and able to solve sophisticated optimisation 
problems. This compares poorly with models that take account of limitations on decision-making, and 
is inconsistent with empirical studies of energy demand behaviour. 
 
Given these considerations, the argument that high discount rates can be considered a rational 
response to risk for most types of energy efficiency investment does not seem plausible. The 
quantitative predictions of the models fail on their own terms, quite apart from the implausibility of 
the behavioural assumptions and the limited range of investment decisions for which they seem 
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applicable. However, business, regulatory or technical risk may be a relevant and important factor in 
some cases. 
 
3.3 Imperfect information  
The importance and policy implications of imperfect information are one of the central issues in the 
barriers debate. The primary claim is that, for a variety of reasons, individuals lack adequate 
information on either individual energy efficiency opportunities or on the energy performance of 
different technologies. This leads them to make sub-optimal decisions based on provisional and 
uncertain information, and consequently to under-invest in energy efficiency. Since imperfect and 
asymmetric information are central to the orthodox understanding of market failures, the existence of 
imperfect information is claimed to justify policy interventions to improve information such as energy 
labelling. Huntington et al (1994) argue that ‘…information problems taking different forms are the 
principal source of market failures that account for the “gap” in energy efficiency investments’.  
 
Imperfect information in energy service markets 
The information relevant to energy efficiency decisions may usefully be grouped into three categories: 
information on the level and pattern of current energy consumption and the comparison of this with 
relevant benchmarks; information on specific energy-saving opportunities, such as the retrofit of 
thermal insulation; and information on the energy consumption of new and refurbished buildings, 
process plant and purchased equipment, allowing choice between efficient and inefficient options. 
 
The availability of information on current energy consumption will depend upon the information 
content of utility bills, the level of sub-metering, the availability of relevant benchmarks, the use of 
computerised information systems, the time devoted to analysing consumption information and so on. 
Most of these will be associated with investment, operational and staff costs which may best be 
understood as a particular category of transaction cost. These costs are of fundamental importance to 
the barriers debate and are discussed more fully in the next section.  
 
The availability of information on energy-specific investment opportunities will depend upon two 
factors: the extent to which organizations have evaluated energy efficiency opportunities through 
measures such as energy audits; and the availability of information on the costs and performance of 
specific energy-saving technologies. The first of these involves costs for the organization (whether the 
audits are conducted in-house or by external consultants), and these may also be understood as a form 
of organizational transaction cost (see Table 3.3).  
 
Information on specific energy efficient technologies should be available in the marketplace, but the 
cost, quality and accuracy of this information may vary widely between different technologies. To the 
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extent that this information has the characteristics of a public good, there may be a case for publicly 
funded information programmes and demonstration schemes - especially for new and unfamiliar 
energy efficiency technologies. 
 
The extent to which information is available on the energy consumption of new and refurbished 
buildings and purchased equipment will depend very much upon the characteristics of the relevant 
market. Energy efficiency is not a stand-alone product in these markets, but a secondary and often 
relatively unimportant feature of a wide range of goods and services (Golove and Eto, 1996). Energy 
services are delivered through a combination of energy commodities, building and transport 
infrastructures and energy conversion technologies, and the decisions made on the specification, 
design, purchase, installation, operation, repair and maintenance of a wide range of technologies will 
influence the overall energy efficiency performance (Golove and Eto, 1996). The informational 
problems associated with energy service markets will therefore be specific to individual technologies 
and services (e.g., motors, lights, buildings, pumps, appliances). If the required information is 
unavailable, of poor quality, overly complicated or unreliable, the market signals in favour of energy 
efficient products and services are likely to be relatively weak. 
 
Asymmetric information in energy service markets 
Asymmetric information exists where the supplier of a good or service holds relevant information, but 
is unable or unwilling to transfer this information to prospective buyers. The extent to which 
asymmetric information leads to market failure will depend upon the nature of the good or service. 
Economists commonly classify goods into three categories: search goods: where a consumer can 
determine characteristics with certainty prior to purchase; experience goods: where consumers can 
only determine characteristics after purchase; and credence goods: where it is difficult for consumers 
to determine quality even after they have begun consumption. 
 
Energy service markets are likely to be characterised by asymmetric information between producer 
and purchaser and between market intermediaries at different stages along the supply chain. The 
importance of this will depend upon the variance in product quality (particularly in relation to energy 
efficiency), the frequency of purchase relative to changes in underlying characteristics and the ‘search 
costs’ entailed in obtaining relevant information. It is useful here to compare the relative importance 
of asymmetric information for the purchase of energy commodities such as gas and electricity, 
compared to the purchase of energy efficiency products or energy efficiency equipment which may 
allow the same level of energy service to be obtained at lower levels of energy consumption (Hewett, 
1998). For example, the same level of thermal comfort may be obtained by using more fuel within an 
existing heating system, or by investing in loft insulation, cavity wall insulation, draught stripping 
and/or double glazed windows.  
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Energy commodities represent a simple, unchanging, easy to understand and homogenous product 
which is purchased from a small number of large, established and generally well trusted firms. 
Purchases are made regularly, market information is widely available and ‘performance’ is judged 
largely on price. Hence, energy commodities can be considered a search good with relatively low 
search costs.3 In contrast, delivering the same service through energy efficiency investment requires 
the purchase of one or more complex, heterogeneous and unfamiliar goods from markets with 
multiple suppliers and intermediaries. Since the lifetime of such products is long (e.g., 15 years), the 
purchases are infrequent and the rate of technical change is rapid relative to the purchase interval 
(Hewett, 1998). For example, technologies such as condensing boilers, building energy management 
systems and electronic ballasts have improved enormously over the last ten years. 
 
In contrast to energy commodities, energy efficiency may only be considered a search good when the 
energy consumption of a product is clearly and unambiguously labelled and when the performance in 
use is insensitive to installation, operation and maintenance conditions. But for many goods, the 
information on energy consumption may be missing, ambiguous or hidden, and the search costs will 
be relatively high. In the absence of standardised performance measures or rating schemes, it may be 
difficult to compare the performance of competing products. Even when rating schemes are available, 
the performance in use may depart significantly from the rated performance – for example when 
technologies are operated on part load or are inadequately maintained. Also, customers may have 
great difficulty in evaluating the performance claims of technology suppliers, or may be suspicious of 
these claims. In these circumstances, energy efficiency is better described as an experience good. 
 
In practice the performance of technologies such as control systems, motors and variable speed drives 
may be very difficult to evaluate even after purchase. In most cases, the evaluation of energy 
performance would require low level electronic sub-metering, adjustment for variable factors such as 
occupancy and weather, and careful analysis of consumption patterns over time. If this is not done, the 
purchaser will lack feedback on the consequences of different purchase decisions, with the result that 
energy use will be relatively invisible (Hewett, 1998). For example, Kempton and Layne (1994) have 
compared the information value of the average household energy bill to that of receiving a single 
monthly bill from the supermarket for ‘food’. Taken together, these features tend to make energy 
efficiency closer to a credence good and hence more subject to market failure. Thus, to the extent that 
energy supply and energy efficiency represent different means of delivering the same level of energy 
service, the latter is likely to be disadvantaged relative to the former. The result is likely to be over-
consumption of energy and under-consumption of energy efficiency (Hewett, 1998). 
                                                 
3
  In the UK, the liberalization of gas and electricity supply markets has increased competition and choice while the same time increasing 
search costs. This process has undoubtedly brought benefits to large users, but the benefits for household consumers are less clear 
(Waddams, 2003). 
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The choice between energy supply and energy efficiency is most relevant to energy-specific 
investment opportunities, such as thermal insulation. But in practice, a more common choice is 
between an energy efficient or inefficient product or service, when a decision is required anyway – for 
example, replacing an existing boiler which has come to the end of its life. What is relevant here is the 
availability of information on the energy performance of the product (and the consequent savings in 
operating costs) as compared to the availability of information on other attributes of the product, such 
as capital costs. This in turn will depend upon the relative importance of energy consumption as 
compared to the other services delivered by the product. For example, thermal efficiency may be 
expected to be an important and visible attribute of a boiler. But energy efficiency may be expected to 
be very much a secondary attribute of other products such as buildings, and is likely to be determined 
by wide range of design and operational factors, the net effect of which may be difficult to assess. In 
the absence of clearly specified and comparable performance information, energy efficiency 
considerations are likely to be easily outweighed by other more visible features. Hence, even if energy 
efficiency is valued by the consumer, the lack or cost of information may prevent this preference from 
being exercised: ‘….Faced with good information on capital costs and poor information on operating 
costs, consumers may rationally and systematically choose the low capital option’ (Eyre, 1997).  
 
Adverse selection in energy service markets 
In some circumstances, asymmetric information in energy service markets may lead to the adverse 
selection of energy inefficient goods. Take housing as an example (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). In a 
perfect market, the resale value of a house would reflect the discounted value of energy efficiency 
investments. But asymmetric information at the point of sale tends to prevent this. Buyers have 
difficulty in recognising the potential energy savings and rarely account for this when making a price 
offer. Estate agents have greater resources than buyers, but similarly neglect energy efficiency when 
valuing a house. Since the operating costs of a house affect the ability of a borrower to repay the 
mortgage, they should be reflected in mortgage qualifications. Again, they are not. In all cases, one 
party (e.g., the builder or the seller) may have the relevant information, but transaction costs impede 
the transfer of that information to the potential purchaser. The result may be to discourage house 
builders from constructing energy efficient houses, or to discourage homeowners from making energy 
efficiency improvements since they will not be able to capture the additional costs in the sale price. 
 
The same processes are at work in a range of energy services markets. In some cases, producers may 
be unable to market desirable technologies since consumers are unable to observe their characteristics 
prior to sale (Howarth and Sanstad, 1995). In other cases, information asymmetries may create 
incentives for producers or suppliers to act opportunistically. For example, the energy efficiency of 
commercial buildings depends heavily on the detailed features of heating, ventilation and controls 
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such as Building Energy Management Systems (BEMS). But in comparison to highly visible features 
such as outward form and aesthetics, the performance of building services equipment is extremely 
difficult for the customer to observe. Substitution of an inefficient or oversized piece of equipment in 
place of efficient equipment could be relatively easy since it would be hard to spot. The result may be 
inefficient products driving efficient products off the market – termed ‘adverse selection’ (Akerlof, 
1970). 
 
Summary  
In summary, problems of imperfect information are likely to pervade energy service markets and 
could potentially explain a substantial proportion of the efficiency gap. First, the acquisition of 
information through measures such as metering and audits involves investment and transaction costs 
which may not be taken into account in engineering-economic models. Second, the search costs for 
energy efficient products are likely to be much greater than those for energy commodities, creating a 
systematic bias against energy efficiency. Third, energy efficiency has the characteristics of a 
credence good, which makes it particularly vulnerable to information market failure. And fourth, 
asymmetric information in energy service markets may sometimes lead to the adverse selection of 
energy inefficient goods.  
 
The appropriate policy response to these market failures is contested. While information programmes 
appear to be the most obvious approach, minimum energy efficiency standards may be more effective 
in some instances. If information programmes are to be employed, both the manner in which 
information is presented and the credibility of the source are important.  
 
The importance of information costs suggests that there is a considerable overlap between imperfect 
information and hidden costs. The next section clarifies these overlaps in more detail. 
 
3.4 Hidden costs 
Hidden costs represent the most important and influential explanation for the ‘efficiency gap’. The 
claim is that engineering-economic studies fail to account for either the reduction in utility associated 
with energy efficient technologies, or the additional costs associated with their use (Nichols, 1994). 
As a consequence, the studies tend to overestimate energy efficiency potential. 
 
Components of hidden costs 
In the energy economics literature, the term ‘hidden costs’ refers to any costs which are not 
conventionally included within engineering-economic models. Three possible sources of hidden costs 
are: 
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the general overhead costs of energy management; the costs which are specific to an individual 
investment in energy efficiency, or the choice of an energy-efficient option; and the potential loss of 
utility associated with energy efficient choices. 
 
Table 3.2 identifies the possible components of these costs in more detail. Each of the cost categories 
may be both real and significant and each may partly account for the gap between real world 
investment behaviour and the predictions of engineering-economic models. But the different 
categories vary widely in their likely importance in particular instances, the extent to which they are 
specific to individual sites and technologies, the ease with which they can be quantified and 
incorporated into energy models, the extent to which they can be reduced by changes in 
organizational procedures and routines, and their relevance for public policy. It is tautologous to 
assert that hidden costs must be present if organizations are not adopting particular energy-efficient 
technologies. Instead, it is necessary to demonstrate what (if any) those costs are, why they are 
important, what is determining them and whether and how they could be reduced. 
 
Table 3.2 Different types of hidden cost 
Sub-category Examples 
General overhead 
costs of energy 
management 
 
 
 
• costs of employing specialist people (e.g., energy manager) 
• costs of energy information systems (including: gathering of energy 
consumption data; maintaining sub metering systems; analysing data and 
correcting for influencing factors; identifying faults; etc.); 
• cost of energy auditing; 
Costs involved in 
individual 
technology decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• cost of: i) identifying opportunities; ii) detailed investigation and design; iii) 
formal investment appraisal; 
• cost of formal procedures for seeking approval of capital expenditures; 
• cost of specification and tendering for capital works to manufacturers and 
contractors 
• additional staff costs for maintenance; 
• costs for replacement, early retirement, or retraining of staff; 
• cost of disruptions and inconvenience; 
Loss of utility 
associated with 
energy efficient 
choices 
 
• problems with safety, noise, working conditions, service quality etc. (e.g., 
lighting levels). 
• extra maintenance, lower reliability, 
 
 
Some hidden costs could be considered part of the production cost of energy efficiency and could in 
principle be included in engineering-economic models (Ostertag, 2003). Examples include design fees 
for large items of plant, the civil engineering costs associated with installing a CHP unit, the costs of 
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re-routing pipework, the reinforcement costs associated with connecting a CHP unit to the grid, the 
costs of rebuilding a flue after a condensing boiler has been installed, the cost of new light fittings to 
accommodate compact fluorescents, and the cost of production interruptions during equipment 
installation. These costs are site-specific and difficult to estimate, so they may be easily overlooked. 
But they represent real costs and organizations can be expected to take them into account in when 
appraising investment opportunities. 
 
A second group of costs relates to the inferior performance of energy efficient technologies along a 
number of dimensions other than energy consumption. For example: an energy-efficient production 
process may lead to increased noise; the installation of cavity wall insulation in an old building may 
encourage damp; a variable speed drive may require extra maintenance or require new skills and 
tools; an energy-efficient motor may be less reliable; the lighting quality from compact fluorescents 
may be less desirable than that from incandescent bulbs; and so on (Golove and Eto, 1996). While 
these considerations clearly apply to energy-specific investment opportunities, they are likely to be 
even more important for investments where energy efficiency is only one of a number of attributes 
under consideration. Again, in principle these costs could be incorporated within engineering-
economic models, but this may be difficult to achieve in practice.  
 
A third group of costs corresponds to the search costs identified in the economics of information. 
These include the cost of identifying suppliers and obtaining information on price, quality and terms 
of trade. As argued above, these costs are strongly influenced by the characteristics of particular 
energy service markets and by the nature of energy efficiency as a good. They are determined in part 
by factors outside the control of the adopting organization, such as the existence or otherwise of 
standardized labelling schemes, and in part by organizational procedures for information gathering, 
specification, purchasing and procurement. Search costs are therefore influenced by a mix of factors 
both internal and external to the organization, and public policy should have greater scope for 
influencing the latter than the former. 
 
Search costs represent a subset of the broader category of transaction costs. These include all the 
organizational costs associated with establishing and maintaining an energy management scheme, 
investing in specific energy saving technologies, and implementing specific energy efficient options 
within broader investment programmes (e.g., choosing energy efficient motors in preference to 
standard motors). In contrast to the production costs and loss of utility discussed above, transaction 
costs depend closely upon organizational and contractual structures, procedures, incentives and 
routines. This makes them much more difficult to incorporate within models which represent costs 
purely in relation to individual technologies.  
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To summarize the above, Table 3.3 provides a theoretical perspective on the components of hidden 
costs which complements the empirical perspective provided by Table 3.2. This divides hidden costs 
into four categories: production costs; loss of utility; market transaction costs; and organizational 
transaction costs. The first two of these categories may be considered as real and unavoidable costs 
which have no implications for public policy, while the last two categories are contingent upon the 
relevant market, contractual and organizational structures and hence may in some circumstances be 
lowered through public or private actions. Identifying the size and determinants of transaction costs is 
likely to be difficult, but four important features of these costs are as follows (Ostertag, 2003): 
 
Table 3.3  Theoretical perspectives on the components of hidden costs 
Sub-category Influenced by Examples 
Hidden 
production costs 
• Attributes of 
technology  
• Site-specific factors 
Civil engineering costs, grid reinforcement costs, 
production interruptions 
Loss of utility • Attributes of 
technology  
• Site-specific factors 
Increased noise, reduced service quality 
Market 
transaction costs 
• Features of primary 
and secondary 
markets for 
information. 
• Organizational 
procedures for 
external transactions 
Search costs for gathering and assimilating information 
regarding product quality; cost of specification and 
tendering; bargaining and negotiation costs; legal 
advice; etc. 
Organizational 
transaction costs 
• Organizational 
procedures for 
internal transactions  
Monitoring and control costs; decision-making costs; 
costs of establishing, maintaining and running energy 
information systems; etc. 
 
 
Transaction costs need not increase in proportion to the volume of the transaction. So for example, the 
transaction costs associated with identifying and purchasing an energy-efficient motor will form a 
declining proportion of total life cycle costs as the size of the motor increases. Transaction costs are 
likely to be incurred for both energy efficient and inefficient choices. So if a replacement motor is 
required, there will be transaction costs for purchasing both energy efficient and inefficient models, 
and what matters is the difference between the two. Transaction costs may only accrue once when 
organizational routines are changed, such as when a shift is made from purchasing standard to high 
frequency fluorescent lighting. So comparing an exceptional situation with an established 
organizational routine may overstate the costs involved. Transaction costs may decrease over time as 
a result of learning effects as knowledge becomes embedded within individual and organizational 
routines. So they should not be treated as a fixed and unchanging. 
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Quantifying hidden costs 
Estimates of hidden costs are rare in the literature. One example is a study by Hein and Blok (1994) 
which estimated the staff costs associated with collecting information, making decisions and 
monitoring the performance of different types of energy efficiency investments within large, energy-
intensive firms. The transaction costs were dominated by search costs and typically formed between 3 
percent and 8 percent of the total investment cost. This suggests that transaction costs were relatively 
small for this type of organization, but they could be much more important for small scale investments 
or for smaller, less energy-intensive firms. Transaction costs are therefore relative to the technical and 
organizational context. 
 
For organizations, one of the most important sources of hidden costs is likely to be the overhead costs 
of energy management. These do not seem to have been subject to serious academic study, but are 
frequently cited by industry as the biggest obstacle to cost-effective investment. For example, 
negotiated agreements between government and industry in the UK require the implementation of 
energy efficiency projects with paybacks as short as three years. The primary reason given by UK 
industry for the use of these strict investment criteria is the management time required to identify and 
implement such projects (ETSU, 2001). These claims should be treated with suspicion, given the 
information asymmetry between government and industry and the incentive for industry to exaggerate 
the importance of hidden costs in order to reduce the stringency of the negotiated agreements. But 
they demonstrate that management time is a predominant concern and that it is accepted by the UK 
government as an adequate explanation of the efficiency gap. 
 
Some simple calculations can demonstrate the potential importance of overhead costs for a typical 
organization. Best practice literature in the UK recommends that a sum equivalent to 5 percent of an 
organization’s annual energy expenditure be reserved for dedicated energy efficiency investment. For 
a site with annual energy costs of £1 million, this would equal £ 50k which is comparable to the 
annual salary costs for a full-time energy manager. In this context, stringent payback criteria for such 
investment projects may be justified as a means to recover the salary overheads – for example, by 
transforming a five year payback into a three year payback. Furthermore, organizations with a small 
energy bill would only be able to devote a fraction of staff time to energy efficiency and would be 
unlikely to develop the relevant energy management skills. However, much of energy management 
could be seen as an essential function necessary for the functioning of the institution and the comfort 
of employees – for example, overseeing maintenance, running building energy management systems 
and negotiating with energy suppliers. Other tasks such as internal reporting, maintaining and 
upgrading information systems, training, marketing, and awareness raising are unlikely to produce 
direct savings, but are essential to creating a climate that is supportive of attempts to improve energy 
efficiency. As a result, it appears unreasonable to require all the salary overheads to be recovered 
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solely from the returns on individual energy efficiency projects. At the same time, it appears equally 
unreasonable for none of the salary overheads to be recovered from such projects.  
 
Summary 
In sum, the majority of energy efficiency investments are likely to be associated with some form of 
hidden cost, and these costs could potentially explain a portion of the efficiency gap. A proportion of 
these costs may be considered part of the production cost of energy efficiency and hence provide no 
rationale for policy intervention. But a proportion may be understood as market or organizational 
transaction costs and hence could potentially be reduced through organizational changes or public 
policy. Hence, while the assertion that hidden costs can explain the entire efficiency gap is merely 
tautologous, the assertion that hidden costs are unimportant is equally likely to be wrong. The truth 
should lie somewhere between the two, but the relative importance of different categories of cost is 
likely to vary between individual technologies and organizations. It appears likely, however, that the 
salary overheads associated with energy management will be a major obstacle for many organizations, 
and especially for those with relatively small energy bills.  
 
3.5 Access to capital  
A commonly cited barrier within the energy efficiency literature is the lack of access to capital (Hirst 
and Brown, 1990). This may be particularly applicable to smaller companies who have less ability to 
offer collateral and may only be able to borrow at high interest rates. This could prevent energy 
efficiency projects with a high rate of return from being undertaken. The orthodox response to this 
argument is that while inability to access capital may constitute a barrier, it need not imply a failure in 
capital markets. Capital should be allocated to projects with the highest risk adjusted rate of return, 
smaller companies may be high risk borrowers (Sutherland, 1996). An alternative view is that the 
transaction costs entailed in investigating the credit worthiness of such companies are sufficiently 
high to diminish the economic viability of loans (Golove and Eto, 1996).  
 
The ‘access to capital’ problem has two components: insufficient capital through internal funds, and 
potential difficulty in raising additional funds through borrowing or share issues; and neglect of 
energy efficiency within internal capital budgeting procedures, combined with other organizational 
rules such as strict requirements on payback periods. Both of these are the subject of a voluminous 
theoretical and empirical literature (Myers, 2001; Stein, 2001). Some key points are discussed below. 
 
Accessing external sources of capital  
Within private sector firms, restrictions on capital are often self-imposed. Here firms appear reluctant 
to borrow money to finance low risk energy efficiency projects with rates of return that significantly 
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exceed their weighted average cost of capital (WACC).4 In some cases, this reluctance appears to 
result from the perceived risk of increasing the ratio of loan finance to equity finance – termed 
gearing (Ross, 1986). Loan finance should be valuable up to a point, since it tends to be cheaper than 
equity – historically, the expected returns from equities are higher than those from loan stocks, and 
loans tend to have a more favourable tax treatment. But loan finance carries risk in that it imposes 
obligations to meet annual interest charges and to repay the principal. In contrast to share dividends, 
these are fixed obligations and are not at the firm’s discretion. High levels of gearing may therefore 
expose the firm to the risk that it will not be able to meet its payment obligations should it experience 
a downturn in business. 
 
With loan finance, the lenders have the legal right to enforce payment of the interest and repayment of 
the capital, using the assets of the company as security. In contrast, ordinary shareholders do not have 
the right to enforce the payment of a dividend. This situation means that high levels of gearing may 
expose the shareholders to greater risk as all the firm’s profits could be eaten up in the repayment of 
lenders. As result, shareholders may demand higher returns as compensation. Furthermore, high levels 
of gearing may also expose the lenders to greater risk, since the asset value may be insufficient to pay 
off the outstanding loans should the firm go out of business. Hence, lenders may also demand higher 
interest payments on loans as the level of gearing increases. The level of risk will depend in part upon 
the resale value of the assets and also upon the proportion of total costs within the firm which are 
fixed – termed operating gearing. The risk of bankruptcy is particularly high for firms which are 
highly geared in both operating and capital terms, since relatively small fluctuations in the level of 
sales can have a dramatic effect on profits (Mclaney, 1994). The net result is that, while loan finance 
may reduce a firm’s cost of capital at low levels of gearing, it may increase risk and raise a firm’s cost 
of capital at high levels of gearing. Management may therefore restrict the level of gearing to a level 
they feel comfortable with.  
 
This traditional view of an ‘optimal’ level of gearing was challenged by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), who showed that, given a set of assumptions about the operation of the capital market, the 
advantages of cheaper loan finance should be exactly offset by the increasing cost of equity. As a 
result, the WACC should be independent of the level of gearing and should depend solely upon 
business risk and future cash flows. But this model effectively assumes that the transaction costs 
within capital markets are zero (Frubotn and Richter, 1997). Also, this theoretical result is not 
supported by the empirical evidence, which shows a reluctance to increase gearing beyond a particular 
level (Myers, 2001). 
 
                                                 
4
  This is calculated from the relative proportions of loan stock and equity for the individual company, and their respective market values 
(Mclaney, 2000, p. 249). 
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Other perspectives on the use of capital markets emphasise information asymmetry and agency 
problems. For example, increased gearing may be in the interest of shareholders if it lowers the cost of 
capital, but may not be desirable from the perspective of company directors because it imposes a 
discipline which they may prefer to avoid. This could dissuade directors from using external funds to 
finance cost-effective investments. Similarly, Myers and Majluf (1984) emphasise how reliance upon 
external finance may be interpreted by investors as a signal that the existing assets are overvalued. It 
is commonly observed that an attempt to raise additional equity finance or to increase the level of 
gearing can weaken a firm’s financial rating and drive down share and bond prices. Since debt 
imposes both greater risk on the firm and greater discipline upon managers, it should have a smaller 
impact than share issues. But in all cases, the cost of obtaining additional capital may exceed the 
average cost of the existing debt/equity mix (Ross, 1986). The prediction, therefore, is that firms will: 
a) prefer internal to external finance; b) prefer debt finance to equity; and c) avoid high levels of 
gearing (Myers, 2001). 
 
Since most energy-specific investment opportunities involve relatively small amounts of capital, they 
should have very little impact on the level of gearing for the firm as a whole (particularly for larger 
companies). But since borrowing requirements and ‘financing risk’ are likely to be assessed for the 
firm as a whole, and not for individual investments, the effect may be to restrict the overall capital 
budget for investment, including that for energy efficiency. This effect may be exacerbated by internal 
capital budgeting procedures which give a lower priority to discretionary cost saving investments (see 
below), with the result that the dedicated energy efficiency budget is reduced. There are analogous 
problems with energy efficient options within broader capital investments, such as new buildings. 
These are typically subject to tight constraints on the capital budget combined with a strong incentive 
to keep the project within budget. Given the transaction costs associated with seeking (small) 
additional increments of funding, the budget for energy efficient options (with higher capital costs but 
lower operating costs) may be squeezed. 
 
In sum, the conventional view that firms should invest in all projects which have a rate of return 
exceeding the WACC appears over simplistic. There may be very good reasons for not taking on 
additional debt or raising additional equity, but these require judgements about business risk and the 
response of the financial market to any increase in gearing. This makes it difficult to assess whether 
the behaviour of any individual firm is rational, or whether it reflects a failure on the part of 
management. 
 
Accessing internal sources of capital  
Two observations are commonly made in respect of the organizational treatment of dedicated energy 
efficiency investments. First, such investments tend to be classified as discretionary business 
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maintenance projects, which are given a lower priority than either essential business maintenance 
projects, such as replacing a failed pump, or strategic business development investments, such as a 
new manufacturing plant (Department of Energy, 1983). Second, such projects tend to be evaluated 
using payback rates rather than discounted cash flow analysis, with the required rates of return 
exceeding those for business development projects (Train, 1985).  
 
A number of hypotheses have been proposed to explain this behaviour, but a common theme is 
asymmetric information within internal agency relationships, such as those between central and 
divisional management. The agent (e.g., the divisional manager) is closest to a project and is likely to 
know most about its prospects, but at the same time may have an incentive to misrepresent this 
information. The principal (e.g., central management) cannot observe either the true quality of 
decision-making or the true profitability of the project. Principals will be unfamiliar with the specific 
local conditions in which the agent makes her decisions and there will be transaction costs entailed in 
transmitting the relevant information. This creates the risk that profits will be dissipated into 
‘managerial slack’ – defined as the excess of resources over the minimum required for the task 
(DeCanio, 1993). One method of reducing this slack is to set the rate of return for investment projects 
to be substantially above the cost of capital to ensure that only highly profitable investments are 
undertaken (Antle and Eppen, 1985). Furthermore, the hurdle rate may be expected to be higher for 
small investments, since the transaction costs of determining the profitability of such investments are 
likely to represent a greater portion of the expected savings. Energy efficiency investments frequently 
fall into this category of small, cost saving investments. 
 
A second explanation could be the strategic priorities of top management. DeCanio (1994) suggests 
that managers are primarily concerned with ensuring the long-term survival of their organization, 
which involves focusing upon dynamic factors such as the introduction of new products and the 
development of new production facilities. Given severe constraints on time and attention (i.e. bounded 
rationality), the small reductions in costs available from energy efficiency investments could easily be 
downgraded and overlooked. This is despite the fact that such investments have frequently been 
shown to have a higher rate of return than large projects which receive more management attention 
(Ross, 1986). This focus is unlikely to change until energy becomes more of a strategic issue, perhaps 
through energy prices internalising the external cost of carbon emissions. 
 
The bias towards strict investment criteria may be exacerbated by the incentives on individual 
managers, including the asymmetry between the risks and rewards of energy efficiency projects. The 
failure of a project in which an individual had invested considerable effort could be very detrimental 
to that person’s career, while the success of a comparable project could provide a much smaller career 
boost (DeCanio, 1994). Similarly, managerial advancement may best be achieved through large, 
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strategic projects, while the compensation and prestige for energy management activities may be 
limited. Hence, as with accessing external sources of capital, there may be both good reasons and 
strong incentives for imposing strict investment criteria or restricting capital budgets for energy 
efficiency investments.  
 
3.6 Split incentives  
Split incentives were discussed earlier and were argued to result from asymmetric information and the 
transaction costs of developing shared savings contracts. While this barrier is most commonly cited in 
relation to rental housing, it is of much wider applicability.  
 
Landlord-tenant problems may arise in the industrial, public and commercial sectors through the 
leasing of buildings and office space. For example, in the UK only 10 percent of commercial property 
is occupied by the freeholder and 70 percent is multi-tenanted. Much of the stock is owned by 
institutional investors who treat the property purely as an asset, while management is outsourced to 
property consultants who pay little attention to energy efficiency. Tenants may have little motivation 
to improve the performance of an asset they do not own, particularly if they have a short term lease, 
while owners will be happy to pass on the energy costs to their tenants. In many cases, tenants will 
simply pay a fixed pro-rata share of the building’s energy bill, which means the savings generated by 
investment or behavioural changes by one tenant would accrue to all the other tenants as well, thereby 
diluting the incentive. The problem could be overcome through low level sub-metering, but this may 
be costly and it appears to be relatively rare. The landlord-tenant hypothesis suggests an obvious 
empirical test – whether the energy performance of leased buildings is significantly poorer than other 
buildings – but there appears to be little research on this topic, and the available evidence is limited. 
 
Within organizations, the bias towards projects with short term paybacks may also result from split 
incentives. It is often the case that managers remain in their post for relatively short periods of time 
(DeCanio, 1993). In large companies, there may even be a policy of job rotation. But a manager who 
is in a post for only two or three years has no incentive to initiate investments that have a longer 
payback period. The incentive structure may therefore be skewed towards projects with rapid returns 
– although these may prove inferior to others if a full discounted cash flow analysis were performed. 
As with landlords and tenants, problems of information and transaction costs may prevent the 
incentive structure from being modified. Statman and Sepe (1984) point to a related issue in that, even 
without job rotation, management incentive structures are typically biased towards short term 
performance.  
 
In larger organizations, departmental accountability for energy costs may be an important issue. If 
individual departments are accountable for their own energy costs, they could directly benefit from 
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any savings from investment projects or housekeeping measures. But if cost savings are recouped 
elsewhere, this incentive is diluted. To introduce such accountability, it would be necessary to sub-
meter and bill individual cost centres for their energy use – which would be associated with 
investment, staff and operational costs. The resulting incentives will be proportional to the importance 
of energy costs to the individual department and would only be effective if the department had the 
capacity to identify and initiate energy efficiency improvements and the budget to fund them. An 
alternative approach would be to place accountability for energy costs with the energy management 
staff, perhaps with individual posts made self-funding from the savings from energy efficiency 
improvements. The difficulty here is in identifying these savings and in adjusting for other sources of 
demand growth which are beyond the control of energy management staff. While energy management 
staff should have the capacity and skill to initiate energy efficiency improvements, they may lack 
local knowledge of individual efficiency opportunities. The appropriate solution will depend very 
much on the size and structure of the organization and complex issues of accountability may arise. 
 
Very similar issues arise in equipment purchasing. The purchaser may have a strong incentive to 
minimise capital costs, but may not be accountable for running costs. Many items of equipment may 
be specified and procured by individuals who lack the knowledge, information and incentives to 
minimise operating costs, while constraints on staff time my inhibit the involvement of energy 
management staff. In a similar manner, maintenance staff may have a strong incentive to minimise 
capital costs and/or to get failed equipment working again as soon as possible, but may have no 
incentive to minimise running costs. This type of issue may also arise with building users, operators 
of process equipment and designers and sub-contractors within construction projects. In each case, the 
responsibility for capital costs may not match the responsibility for operating costs, while the 
transaction costs of reducing the problem may outweigh the potential savings to be achieved.  
 
3.7 Bounded rationality 
Several of the barriers discussed above (e.g., risk) would still apply if actors were gifted with the 
perfect rationality assumed in orthodox theory. In other cases (e.g., hidden costs), bounded rationality 
may be considered partly responsible for the barrier, since it contributes to the existence of transaction 
costs. But bounded rationality may also be classified as a barrier itself, since it contributes to 
decisions which depart from those predicted by orthodox models. This may occur even when actors 
have adequate motivation, incentives and information and when other barriers to energy efficiency are 
absent. For example, Eyre has argued that: ‘...There is a market failure to the extent that consumers do 
not attempt to maximise their utility or producers their profits.’ (Eyre, 1997). The benchmark for this 
judgement is the ‘optimising’ rationality assumed in orthodox theory. As Sanstad and Howarth note: 
‘...individuals and firms do not always behave according to the logic of economic rationality but they 
should. They need policies to help them do it.’ (Sanstad and Howarth, 1994). The findings of 
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behavioural economics may allow these departures from full rationality to be predicted and may also 
inform the design of policy interventions. 
 
A primary consequence of bounded rationality is that constraints on time, attention, resources and the 
ability to process information lead to optimising analyses being replaced by imprecise routines and 
rules of thumb. In organizations, this could mean focusing on core activities, such as the primary 
production process, rather than peripheral issues such as energy use. Decision making may also be 
divided up between specialists, and global objectives may be replaced by tangible sub-goals whose 
achievement can be measured (Simon, 1959). 
 
An interesting example of the importance of bounded rationality is provided by Coormans’ (2009) 
review of the use of formal capital budgeting tools within investment decision-making. In contrast to 
the standard recommendation that investments with a positive net present value (NPV) should go 
ahead, she found that formal capital budgeting thickly typically played only a partial and secondary 
role within investment decision-making. Empirical studies showed that investment analysis was 
frequently conducted relatively late in the decision-making process and often served to justify 
decisions already taken. Instead, the key factor determining whether an investment went ahead was its 
contribution to the strategic objectives of the firm - including the extent to which it contributes to 
competitive advantage within the core business. This helps explain the observation that companies 
sometimes made negative decisions on profitable investments and positive decisions on non-profitable 
investment. Coormans argues that first, orthodox capital budgeting theory has little relatively little 
value in explaining investment decisions and instead plays a normative role; and second, that agency 
theory and transaction cost economics were insufficient to explain organizational behaviour. This 
conclusion seems questionable, however, since a focus upon strategic priorities (and a corresponding 
neglect of small, cost saving investments) is precisely what we would expect from boundedly-rational 
individuals. 
 
Empirical studies of energy decisions generally support the hypothesis of bounded rationality 
(Sanstad and Howarth, 1994). For example, Stern and Aronson (1984) finds that consumers hold 
information on household energy use which is: ‘…not only incomplete, but systematically incorrect.’ 
Similarly, the provision of accurate information on costs and benefits does not necessarily improve 
the quality of decision making. In a survey of energy information programmes, Robinson (1991) 
concludes that ‘... it is clear that, with the exception of some labelling programmes, energy 
information programmes on their own have not to date resulted in significant energy savings’. The 
implication here is that not only may bounded rationality provide an additional barrier to energy 
efficiency, it may also undermine the effectiveness of certain types of policy interventions Sanstad 
and Howarth (1994). If agents lack the time, capacity or skills to use existing information, there is 
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little point in providing more information. This point is important as it directly contradicts the 
orthodox argument that intervention should be directed at correcting information market failures, 
rather than imposing performance standards. In practice, standards may be more effective in inducing 
energy efficiency improvements as they bypass the problem of bounded rationality (Sanstad and 
Howarth, 1994). Whether they are more cost-effective will depend upon the relative cost of the 
regulation compared to information programmes. 
 
Routines as a response to bounded rationality 
Within organizations, most decisions are likely to be the consequence of applying a set of rules and 
routines to a situation, rather than a systematic analysis of alternatives. As Stern and Aronsen note 
(1984) notes: ‘Organisations generally solve problems and respond to environmental demands by 
applying existing routines rather than developing new ones’. The simple payback rule can be 
considered as one such routine. While software packages allow rates of return to be calculated very 
easily, the payback rule may still have an advantage as it is simple and easy to communicate 
(DeCanio, 1994). Capital budgeting procedures could be considered a second type of rule, used in 
delegating the authority to spend money. Typically, the primary concern when evaluating an 
investment opportunity is whether there is money in the budget, rather than the rate of return (Stern 
and Aronsen, 1984). Expenditures that exceeds the budget (i.e. break the rule) require administrative 
approval, a potentially complex and lengthy process that discourages attempts to do so. Routines 
therefore facilitate information handling and minimise transaction costs, but can be inflexible. 
 
A valuable example of the importance of routines is given by de Almeida’s (1998) study of the French 
market for energy efficient motors. When small end users had to buy motors in an emergency, the 
only parameters they considered were delivery time and price. The rule of thumb was to buy the same 
type and brand as the failed motor from the nearest retailer. Similarly, maintenance departments in 
large firms evaluated motors only in terms of maintenance costs and reliability, and ignored energy 
consumption. The split incentives barrier is partly responsible here, since maintenance departments 
are accountable for maintenance costs and process reliability, rather than energy costs. But de 
Almeida (1998) argues that that this barrier is reinforced by the time constraints on maintenance staff 
and their limited capacity to process information. This leads to the development of organizational 
routines that simplify motor procurement by ignoring energy efficiency. In this area, as in many 
others, split incentives and bounded rationality reinforce one another. The motor example also 
demonstrates the importance of analysing specific technology decisions, since the relative importance 
of bounded rationality may be expected to vary with the type of decision – for example between 
emergency replacement, routine replacement and new requirement. 
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Another example of routines comes from the construction industry, where designers rely heavily on 
simplified and outdated (but cognitively efficient) rules of thumb for sizing heating, ventilation and 
air-conditioning (HVAC) equipment (Lovins, 1992). This frequently results in equipment which is 
oversized in relation to the load, and which runs inefficiently on part load. Building designers rely on 
similar rules of thumb for acceptable capital cost per unit floor area, with the result that the potential 
trade-offs between capital and operating costs are overlooked (Lovins, 1992). Similar examples are to 
be found throughout engineering design, where professionals working to intense time pressures rely 
heavily on standardised designs (Lovins and Lovins, 1997). 
 
Other types of rules and routines which may impact on energy efficiency include: operating 
procedures (such as leaving equipment running or on standby); safety and maintenance procedures; 
relationships with particular suppliers; design criteria; specification and procurement procedures; 
equipment replacement routines and so on. These may either be formally specified in written 
procedures or embedded in organizational practices. Since routines are a means of allocating 
attention, energy efficiency opportunities will receive little attention if they do not form part of 
standard routines and operating procedures. And to the extent that consideration of energy efficiency 
entails transaction costs or requires additional cognitive effort, in may easily be squeezed out by other 
priorities. 
 
Inertia and the status quo bias 
Routines can be surprisingly persistent and entrenched. For example, Fawkes and Jacques (1987) 
observed that staff in a brewery preferred to use an inefficient design of pump because it was ‘easy to 
clean’: 
‘...Only after extensive tests and persuasive efforts did the brewers admit that it was just as easy to 
clean the more efficient pump...... the brewers exhibited an almost fanatical unwillingness to even 
consider change.’(Fawkes and Jacques, 1987). 
 
This type of problem has been labelled inertia within the energy efficiency literature and identified as 
a relevant explanatory variable for the efficiency gap (Katzev, 1987; Stern and Aronsen, 1984). From 
an orthodox perspective, inertia does not constitute a recognised market failure and provides no 
grounds for policy intervention. But from a behavioural economics perspective, inertia is exactly what 
we would expect. First, we have the observation that gains are treated differently from losses. This 
means that opportunity costs will be undervalued relative to out-of-pocket costs, and foregone gains 
will be considered to be less painful than perceived losses. In the case of energy efficiency, 
organizations will consider themselves ‘endowed’ with their existing buildings, equipment and energy 
bill (Hewett, 1998). The potential savings in energy costs from energy efficiency improvements will 
be considered an opportunity cost, while the investment costs of energy efficient equipment will be 
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considered an out-of-pocket cost. Loss aversion will therefore tend to bias individuals against making 
such improvements. As Thaler (1991) notes: ‘[A] certain degree of inertia is introduced into the 
consumer choice process since goods that are included in the individual’s endowment will be more 
highly valued than those not held in the endowment ...’. 
 
Second, we have the observation that individuals tend to be risk averse with respect to gains. In the 
case of energy efficiency investment, uncertainty over factors such as technology performance, 
reliability, lifetime and length of ownership will create uncertainty in the potential energy savings. In 
contrast, continuing with the existing ‘endowment’ is likely to give more predictable outcomes 
(Hewett, 1998). Since outcomes that are known with certainty will be given greater weighting than 
those that are uncertain, this will reinforce the tendency to inertia.  
 
A third factor is the desire to minimize regret: 
‘Action and decisions require a greater justification than inaction, than failing to decide.….If our 
actions do not pan out, or cause a loss, we regret having acted. If, instead, we do not act, if we 
leave things as they are, and our investment does not pan out, or we lose, we still suffer regret but 
the regret is lesser.’ (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994) 
 
All these factors may cause individuals and organizations to favour the status quo and to neglect 
potential improvements in energy efficiency, even when other market and organizational failures are 
absent. It is in this sense that cognitive biases may be considered as an additional barrier to energy 
efficiency. Rather similar conclusions were drawn by Stern and Aronsen (1984) in a review of 
behavioural research on energy efficiency. Stern utilized a theory known as ‘cognitive dissonance’ to 
conclude that: a) people tend to rationalize previous decisions, emphasizing the positive aspects of the 
decision and the negative aspects of the unchosen alternative; b) this tendency is greater for difficult, 
costly or irreversible decisions; and c) people remember the plausible arguments for their own 
position and forget the plausible arguments opposing their position. Hence people resist change 
because they are committed to what they are doing, and they justify that inertia by the downgrading of 
contrary information.  
 
As Williamson (1989) argues, one of the functions of organizations is to economize on bounded 
rationality and mitigate such biases through the use of specialization. But while biases may be 
reduced, they are unlikely to be eliminated. Similarly, while competitive market pressures should help 
to squeeze out inefficiencies within private firms, the potential savings through energy efficiency may 
be relatively small compared to the other determinants of competitive advantage and hence may 
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persist.5 In practice, empirical studies of managerial decision-making have suggested that loss 
aversion and risk aversion may be even stronger than in the individual context (Swalm, 1966). 
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) note that decision makers become more risk averse when they expect 
choices to be reviewed by others, while the rhetoric of prudent decision-making favours the certainty 
effect. For example, Swalm (1966) cites a manager who declined to pursue a project that had a 50-50 
chance of either making US$ 300k or losing US$ 60k. 
 
The above observations are generic – inertia may prevent the take-up of a wide range of opportunities, 
not simply those related to energy efficiency. But the important point is the effect of inertia on energy 
efficiency investment relative to that on purchasing energy as a commodity. This is analogous to the 
effect of imperfect information on energy efficiency investment relative to the purchase of energy 
commodities. In both cases, we would expect there to be a bias against energy efficiency and in 
favour of purchasing energy commodities. Inertia matters more for energy efficiency because it 
involves investing in hardware with uncertain outcomes and because it represents a departure from the 
status quo. Since energy efficiency and energy purchasing can provide alternative means of delivering 
the same energy service, this may be economically inefficient. 
 
3.8 Contextual factors 
The taxonomy of six barriers described above primarily relates to internal decision-making within the 
relevant organizations. But internal decision-making will be influenced by a range of broader, 
contextual factors that can either encourage or inhibit the adoption of energy efficient technologies - 
for example, the common practice of subsidizing energy prices can be a major disincentive to 
improving energy efficiency. Although these factors generally lie outside the direct influence of 
individual firms, they can impede the adoption of energy efficiency measures.  
 
Some contextual factors directly follow from government policy, or the lack thereof. A common 
example is where government subsidizes the cost of energy to industry, or where a focus on energy 
supply policy undermines the motivation to address energy demand. Others relate to particular 
industrial sectors, such as the lack of standards and benchmarks and the limited scope for 
collaboration on issues such as energy management. Also relevant is the availability and price of 
energy efficient products and services in different countries and regions. Three developing country 
examples of such factors are: a) the lack of government support for awareness building inhibiting the 
adoption of energy efficient pumps and fans in China (CERF/IIEC, 2002); b) direct and indirect 
                                                 
5
  It is an empirical question as to whether the potential savings are really small, or are merely perceived to be small. Lovins 
and Lovins (1997, p. 11) quote the example of a chief executive officer of a Fortune 100 company who stated that “I 
can’t really get excited about energy – it’s only a few percent of my cost of doing business.” But if the cost savings 
achieved by the energy manager at one of his company’s sites could have been reproduced throughout the company, it 
would have boosted the net earnings that year by 56 percent.  
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taxation on imported goods increasing the first cost differential between efficient and inefficient 
products in a number of developing countries (UNESCAP, 2001); and c) a combination of the lack of 
institutional capacity to implement energy efficiency programs, the neglect of energy efficiency 
within fiscal policy and the absence of performance standards for end use equipment all inhibiting the 
adoption of energy efficient air-conditioning equipment in China and Ghana (IEA, 2009).  
 
Such contextual factors may either: increase the importance of one or more of the identified barriers 
to energy efficiency (e.g., the absence of energy labelling schemes making it more difficult and costly 
to obtain information on energy efficiency); make it more difficult to overcome barriers to energy 
efficiency (e.g., lack of institutional capacity preventing the introduction of labelling schemes); or 
introduce additional barriers of their own (e.g., tax treatment of imported goods making energy 
efficient products more expensive). 
But the nature and relevance of such contextual factors may be expected to vary widely from one 
country, sector and technology to another and stakeholders may have different views on their relative 
importance. For example, in a study of voluntary agreements in China, Eichhorst and Bongardt (2009) 
found that government representatives placed much greater importance on providing technical 
assistance than did the industry representatives themselves. Studies of energy efficiency in developing 
countries typically highlight the absence of energy efficiency policies and programs to encourage 
awareness and training, the lack of a single agency or ministry with responsibility for energy 
efficiency and the prevalence of energy subsidies that undermine the business case for energy 
efficiency. Such obstacles may be challenging to overcome owing to the different interests involved. 
For instance, a number of studies have recommended the consolidation of Chinese steel and cement 
production within larger, more energy efficient firms, but this could have serious consequences for 
employment and regional politics. 
 
3.9 Summary  
This section has attempted to improve the understanding of barriers to energy efficiency by applying a 
number of concepts from economic theory. A ‘barrier’ was defined as a mechanism that inhibits a 
decision or behaviour that appears both energy and economically efficient. This term is widely used 
within the energy efficiency literature, but there is no consensus on how barriers should be 
understood, how important they are in different contexts, and how (if at all) they should be addressed. 
This makes barriers the subject of disciplinary disputes within academia and more fundamental 
conflicts within the politics of climate change. 
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The section began by introducing the concept of a barrier and the criticisms of the barrier model by 
orthodox economists. This led to a distinction between barriers and orthodox market failures and a 
recognition that some barriers may provide no grounds for policy intervention while others may prove 
too costly to overcome. The orthodox perspective may be criticized, however, for treating market 
failures as absolute rather than relative, for ignoring barriers which were internal to organizations and 
for adopting an unrealistic model of individual rationality.  
 
The section then introduced six barriers to energy efficiency and explored the operation and 
consequences of these barriers in some detail. It argued that each barrier may be explained by more 
than one of the ideas discussed earlier and that several mechanisms may be expected to coexist. For 
example, hidden costs may result from search costs within product markets, organizational transaction 
costs and the costs resulting from interruptions to production. Similarly, restrictions on capital budgets 
may result from the financing risk of increased gearing, the agency relationships between central and 
divisional management, and the transaction costs of raising additional internal or external funds. The 
relative importance of each factor may be expected to vary between different technologies and 
organizations. Table 3.4 summarizes how these different barriers to energy efficiency may be 
understood from the perspectives of orthodox economics and transaction cost/behavioural economics. 
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Table 3.4  Understandingbarriers to energy efficiency using concepts from orthodox economics and agency theory, and from transaction cost and   
behavioural economics 
 
Barrier  Orthodox and agency perspectives  Transaction cost and behavioural perspectives 
Risk  Energy efficient technologies may be subject to higher technical risk 
Energy efficiency investments may be illiquid and irreversible, so the 
value of future benefits should be discounted more highly Energy 
efficiency investments may require a high rate of return to reflect the 
option value of delaying investment  
Energy efficiency investments may have a high asset 
specificity and hence carry higher risks than other forms of 
investment Individual and organizational perceptions of risk 
may depart from those assumed in orthodox models and the 
resulting loss aversion may create a bias against energy 
efficient investment.  
 
Imperfect information Some types of information relevant to energy efficiency may have 
the features of a public good and hence may be undersupplied by 
markets.  
Since energy efficiency has the characteristics of a credence good, 
while energy commodities have the characteristics of a search good, 
there may be a systematic bias against the former.  
 
The search costs associated with identifying the energy consumption 
of products may be high, thereby creating a barrier to such purchases.  
In some circumstances, asymmetric information within energy 
service markets may lead to the adverse selection of inefficient 
products. 
 
There will be transaction costs associated with acquiring, 
understanding and applying information. Bounded rationality 
ensures that these will be significant, even when information is 
freely available.  
 
The transaction costs of information acquisition may be high as 
a consequence of poor presentation, the lack of credibility of 
the source or the absence of interpersonal contacts.  
Hidden costs  Some energy efficient options may be associated with hidden costs, 
such as disruptions to production.  
 
Some energy efficient technologies may perform poorly along other 
dimensions, such as reliability.  
 
The search costs associated with identifying energy efficient products 
may be high. Energy efficiency investments may need to recover 
‘overhead’ costs.  
 
 
The transaction costs associated with maintaining information 
systems, conducting energy audits, identifying opportunities, 
tendering, selecting suppliers, seeking approval for capital 
expenditures and so on may outweigh the potential savings in 
energy costs.  
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Access to capital  The cost of obtaining additional capital may exceed the average cost 
of the existing debt/equity mix, owing to the financing risk of 
increased gearing.  
Agency problems between shareholders and managers, plus the 
signalling associated with external financing may create a preference 
for internal finance and a reluctance to increase borrowing.  
 
Agency problems between central and divisional managers may lead 
to capital rationing as a form of control.  
 
There may be asymmetry between the risks and rewards of energy 
efficiency projects.  
 
There will be transaction costs associated with obtaining 
additional funding from either internal or external sources, and 
these may be more significant for small, cost saving projects.  
The transaction costs of transmitting and assessing information 
on investment opportunities may inhibit optimal decision-
making.  
Given severe constraints on time and attention, managers may 
focus on strategic investments and overlook small cost saving 
opportunities  
 
Split incentives  For a range of reasons, individuals, departments or organizations may 
not be able to appropriate the benefits of energy efficiency 
investments  
 
Transaction costs inhibit the development of shared savings 
contracts to overcome split incentive problems.  
Bounded rationality  • N/A  Constraints upon time, attention, resources and ability to 
process information lead to the use of imprecise routines and 
rules of thumb, which may systematically neglect the small 
cost savings from energy efficiency improvements. 
 
Loss aversion and status quo bias contributes to inertia and the 
undervaluing of the benefits of energy cost saving relative to 
the out-of-pocket costs of investment.  
 
Risk aversion with respect to gains reinforces this inertia.  
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4 Summary of findings from recent empirical studies 
This section summarizes some of the main findings from our review of recent empirical studies on 
barriers to energy efficiency – i.e., those studies that included either data gathered directly from 
interviews and surveys or from the meta-analysis of other studies. This includes a count of the number 
of times that each of the barriers in out taxonomy was mentioned within the sample, comments on the 
three most cited barriers, a discussion of how the obstacles faced by SMEs differ from those faced by 
large, energy-intensive industry and some brief policy implications. Section 4.2 looks in more detail at 
the problems faced by developing countries.6 
 
4.1 Findings on barriers to energy efficiency 
64 of the studies (40 percent of the total) were classified as empirical in that they included primary 
data gathered directly from interviews and surveys or from the meta-analysis of other studies. These 
studies provided information on barriers to energy efficiency, but the nature, amount and quality of 
this information varied widely from one study to another. The barriers that are identified and 
discussed in these studies have been categorized as far as possible according to the taxonomy 
indicated in Table 2.3. This necessarily involves some judgement, since the studies classify barriers 
under a wide range of (frequently overlapping) headings and most of them do not use the same 
taxonomy as in Table 3.1. Three commonly encountered problems were that:  
 
Several of the barriers identified in a study mapped on to a single barrier within our taxonomy. For 
example, de Groot (2001) lists both ‘energy efficiency has low priority’ and ‘energy costs are not 
sufficiently important’. These could be understood as examples of bounded rationality, where 
constraints upon time, attention, resources and the ability to process information lead managers to 
focus attention upon strategic priorities rather than small-scale cost saving (Cooremans, 2009). 
 
A single barrier identified in a study could be interpreted in more than one way. For example, ‘long 
decision chains’ (Thollander and Ottosson, 2008) and ‘…a lack of coordination between different 
sections within our company’ (Hasanbeigi, et al., 2009) could suggest either hidden costs in 
overcoming internal coordination problems or the widespread prevalence of split incentives, or both. 
 
Barriers were identified that were not included in our taxonomy. For example, many studies 
highlighted broader, contextual factors such as ‘lack of access to external technical support’ (Shi, et 
al., 2008). 
                                                 
6
 We also sought to examining the differences in terms of the prevalence and importance of barriers between those firms that 
mainly use energy for generic uses such as heating and lighting and those firms which use energy intensive production 
processes, as well as between those firms that were subsidiaries of multinational companies (or part of a joint venture) and 
those that were domestically owned. However, very few of the studies reviewed paid attention to these distinctions.  
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In many cases, these inconsistencies reflected a lack of rigour in conceptualizing barriers, the 
inclusion of factors that do not qualify as barriers under our definition, or the inclusion of factors that 
have little relevance for public policy. For example: 
 
‘organization is not aiming at a profit maximization’ (Velthuijsen, 1993) is difficult to demonstrate 
empirically, provides little guidance on whether policy intervention may be justified (and what form it 
should take) and begs the question of why that is the case (i.e. the specific nature of the market and 
organizational failures);  ‘the government does not give incentives to improve energy efficiency’, 
‘lack of enforcement of government regulations’ and ‘ lack of coordination between different 
government agencies’ fail to explain why cost-effective technologies are being neglected by 
individual organizations; ‘concern about competitiveness’ fails to explain why investments that 
should in principle improve competitiveness are not being made; and ‘slim organization’ (Thollander 
and Ottosson, 2008) is difficult to interpret without further explanation.  
The main exception was the frequent reference to heterogeneity, which is where a technology that 
appears cost-effective on the average is not appropriate in a specific situation (Jaffe and Stavins, 
1994).7 This is a widely cited explanation for the ‘energy efficiency gap’ and the frequency with 
which it occurs in our sample of the empirical literature suggests that it is important. In general, 
however, the difficulties in classifying barriers point to the ambiguity of the concept and the fact that 
the relevant empirical phenomena can be classified and interpreted in multiple ways.  
 
Having classified the relevant barriers within each study according to our taxonomy, we recorded the 
number of times that each of these barriers was mentioned within the sample of studies, thereby 
allowing a quantitative picture to be provided of the results. Although this is a crude procedure, the 
results provide some indication of the relative importance of each barrier in preventing cost-effective 
improvements in industrial energy efficiency. The results are summarized in Figure 4.1 and Figure 
4.2. In addition, many of the individual studies implied a rank order in that some barriers were 
discussed more prominently than others. The implied importance of barriers for each individual study 
is captured in the database.  
 
                                                 
7
 For example, small scale CHP may be demonstrated to be cost-effective for medium sized sites in the brewing industry. 
But within this definition of a class of users, there may be wide variation in actual characteristics. In the case of CHP, 
profitability depends on high annual utilisation and typically requires at least two-shift, 6 days/week working patterns. While 
this may be the norm in a particular sector, it may not apply in all cases. Hence, for a subset of the population with low 
annual operating hours, CHP will not be profitable. 
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Figure 4.1  Simple count of the number of mentions of specific barriers to energy efficiency 
  within the sample of studies (n=147 references cited in 64 studies)1 
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3The representation above is of a non-exclusive count in that most reports contain references to 
multiple barriers.  
 
 
Figure 4.2  Simple count of the number of mentions of specific barriers to energy efficiency 
 within the sample of studies - distinguishing between developed and developing  
 countries 
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1 
‘Developing countries’ predominantly means studies covering emerging economies in Asia, especially India and China. 
Developed countries are those in the OECD. Emerging economies refers to those studies which specifically identify one of 
the BRIMC countries, rather than overall developing countries or regions (e.g., Asia, Latin America) In the chart above, 
studies focused on developing and emerging economies are combined with those that focused on both developed and 
developing countries, or that do not address geographical context.  
 
3The representation above is of a non-exclusive count in that most reports contain references to 
multiple barriers.  
 
While all six of the barriers in our taxonomy appeared in the sample, the three that appeared most 
prominent were imperfect information, access to capital and bounded rationality.  
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Imperfect information 
The frequency with which references to imperfect information appeared in the literature suggests a 
persistent view that managers would invest more in energy efficiency if they were more 
knowledgeable about the opportunities and the benefits. As a result, awareness raising and 
information programmes are repeatedly identified as priorities for public policy. Lack of information 
frequently coexists with inadequate skills and training, with the two factors tending to reinforce each 
other. Numerous papers pointed to the lack of information on current energy consumption owing to 
the high costs of measuring and monitoring (a form of hidden cost), the absence of adequate tools and 
procedures to account for economic benefits of efficiency improvements, the failure of the market to 
supply sufficient information on the energy performance of different products, the high cost of 
acquiring and using information on energy consumption, the tendency of contractual parties to exploit 
information asymmetries and the problems of adverse selection. In all cases, information problems 
coexisted with other barriers and both reinforced and were reinforced by those barriers. As a result, 
the information problems can be interpreted in a number of ways – most notably in terms of the 
hidden costs associated with acquiring information (Table 3.3). For example: 
 
A survey of Swedish paper and pulp firms found that one third of the studied mills did not allocate 
energy costs to individual cost-centres by means of sub-metering. Instead, the costs were allocated on 
a square metre basis or some other crude measure (Thollander and Ottosson, 2009). As a result, the 
cost centres lacked information on their energy consumption and also lacked the incentive to reduce 
their consumption (split incentives). Whether the benefits of investing in sub-metering would 
outweigh the associated (hidden) costs are difficult to assess, but the fact that sub-metering is widely 
used in this sector suggests that it should be viable.  
 
A survey by a US utility on the barriers to replacing forced air heaters with infrared heaters found that 
there were major difficulties in predicting energy savings given the wide range of variables that must 
be considered (Chen, 2007). The corresponding neglect of this technology could be interpreted as 
resulting from imperfect information on the associated energy savings, or from the risk that the energy 
savings will be less than anticipated or from the hidden staff and other costs required to conduct the 
relevant analysis. 
 
A survey of the domestic Chinese market for pumps and fans found that it was dominated by products 
with low capital costs, low efficiency and high running costs (CERF/IIEC, 2002). The majority of end 
users were low wage agricultural workers who lacked information and awareness of the different 
options available and often were unable to assess running costs accurately. Chinese pump and fan 
manufacturers were able to provide efficient models at competitive prices but chose to concentrate 
these on the export market where demand for those models was greater. While imperfect information 
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plays an important role here, the priority given to minimizing capital costs may also reflect difficulties 
in accessing finance among Chinese consumers. 
 
A comprehensive survey of industrial, public and commercial organizations in Germany found the 
lack of information about energy consumption to be important barrier in seven out of the nineteen 
sectors examined (Schleich, 2009). The relevant sectors had low energy intensity, suggesting both that 
the (hidden) costs for measuring and monitoring energy consumption could be prohibitive and that 
employees in the sectors had less knowledge and expertise on energy related issues. 
 
Bounded rationality 
In many cases, the lack of information on energy efficiency is partly the result of time constraints and 
the pressure of multiple commitments which can undermine the efficacy of decision making. In this 
context, boundedly rational decision-makers will economize on cognitive resources by relying 
routines and rules of thumb. This can conserve time as a scarce resource, but may frequently result in 
energy efficiency opportunities being overlooked. For example, technological solutions may be 
routinely over-specified to exceed reliability criteria rather than optimized for efficient operation 
(Sorrell, 2003). Bounded rationality also contributes to risk aversion and leads managers to focus 
attention on strategic investments as opposed to more incremental energy efficiency measures. For 
example, turnover of equipment may be slower than optimal if an operational area is considered less 
than central to strategic planning. As with information problems, bounded rationality coexists with, 
reinforces and helps explain other problems such as split incentives (Table 3.4) and the observed 
phenomena can often interpreted in a number of ways. Examples occur throughout the studies 
reviewed and include: 
 
A recommendation following a self-evaluation of utility-sponsored industrial energy efficiency 
initiative in Canada was to “….…keep program procedures (including applications, measurement and 
verification) as simple and transparent as feasible to maximize participation and energy savings” 
(Tiedemann and Sulyma, 2009). 
 
A paper presenting the case for energy management standards which observed that: "the energy 
savings potential of motor systems remains largely unrealized because it is deeply embedded in 
industrial operational and management practices" (McKane, et al., 2007).  
 
Case studies of 48 organizations in the higher education, brewing and mechanical engineering sectors 
found repeated examples of staff making sub-optimal decisions owing largely to severe constraints on 
their time (Sorrell, 2000c; Sorrell, et al., 2004). The following quotations illustrate the problem: 
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“…When we replace a pump in that situation we are governed by the physical dimensions, the 
duty, and the cost. Probably no other questions get asked. Also, the decision wouldn’t even get 
to me until it was time to sign the order. Very often the decision goes through the service unit or 
the supervisor. The foreman and supervisor would be the only people involved. It’s normally an 
emergency situation. The existing one may be 30 years old and they don’t make them anymore. 
We may have flanges with imperial measurements and new ones are metric - blah blah 
blah.....It’s driven by need to replace it quickly. If one is available, get the same type as what’s 
in at the moment. If not, get something that will physically fit. Energy efficiency just doesn’t 
come into it....” (Sorrell, 2000b). 
 
“Their prime focus is getting the product through and getting the quality right. To be honest, 
energy efficiency is at the back of their minds……..There are lots and lots of things where you 
think 'If you looked at so and so that would save us money' but you don't have time to follow it 
up.” (Sorrell, 2000a) 
Hidden costs  
When assessing proposed energy efficiency projects, some factors may be well understood at the 
operations level within a plant while being less visible from outside. For example, temporary shut 
downs of machinery may be very unpopular with operations managers owing to the costs of lost 
production. Similarly, maintaining a capability to assess the benefits of energy efficiency on an 
ongoing basis will involve capital costs for energy information systems and ongoing costs for 
personnel to operate those systems. These costs are ‘hidden’ from the policy perspective and could 
partly explain the ‘efficiency gap’ identified by energy-economic models. The sample of studies 
provided repeated examples of such costs, with many studies highlighting how time constraints on 
staff prevented cost-effective opportunities from being taken up. While staffing levels could be 
increased, the associated costs could more than outweigh the saving in energy costs. Typical examples 
include: 
 
A study promoting the non-energy benefits of energy efficiency investments found that: “…many 
projects will require process line shutdown during implementation, causing production losses. To gain 
credibility with the industrial sector, it is critical to be able to quantify both the upside and downside 
potential of proposed projects” (Pye and McKane, 1999). 
 
A survey of 40 Swedish pulp and paper firms found that ‘the cost of production 
disruption/hassle/inconvenience’ was the second most cited barrier to energy efficiency (Thollander 
and Ottosson, 2008).  
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A survey of Thai cement firms found that ‘the time required to improve energy efficiency’ was the 
third most cited barrier, while a similar survey of Thai textile firms found the ‘cost of production 
disruption’ was the fourth most cited barrier (Hasanbeigi, et al., 2009). 
 
Case studies of California cement companies found that the combination of limited staff time and 
concern about production interruptions were the major barriers to energy efficiency improvements, 
despite energy accounting for more than 10 percent of total costs (Coito and Allen, 2007). The study 
noted that keeping equipment operating and avoiding production disruptions was the highest priority, 
with kiln shutdowns being restricted to once a year to avoid stressing the ceramic insulation (Coito, et 
al., 2005).  
 
Other barriers 
The sample also provided numerous examples of risk and difficulties in accessing capital, but rather 
fewer examples of split incentives. Some illustrative examples include: 
 
Risk: A survey of 40 Swedish pulp and paper firms found that ‘technical risks such as risk of 
production disruptions’ was the most widely cited barrier to energy efficiency, while a comparable 
survey of the Swedish foundry industry found that this was the second most important barrier 
(Rohdin, et al., 2007). Similarly, the US Industrial Technologies Program, building upon wide-
ranging experience, found that low-risk, incremental change was greatly favoured over higher-risk 
transformational technologies (USDOE, 2008). 
 
Access to capital: A study of the California cement industry found that many energy efficiency 
opportunities involved large capital investments and that most customers cite limited capital 
availability as a key reason why this had not been taken up (Coito and Allen, 2007). Similarly, a 
survey of 30 Swedish foundries found that ‘access to capital’ was the most important barrier to energy 
efficiency (and ‘other priorities for capital investment’ was the fourth), while a survey of 187 
Norwegian food & drink companies found that ‘lack of investment capital or capital needed for other 
priorities’ was the second most cited barrier to energy efficiency (Helgerud and Sandbakk, 2009). 
 
Split incentives: A study of compressed air systems in the EU found that the primary barriers were 
organizational, rather than technical, with multiple departments having conflicting objectives across 
finance, purchasing, production, operations and maintenance (Radgen and Blaustein, 2000). A study 
of motor systems gave comparable results, finding that: “…incentive structures within companies are 
frequently structured to reward lowest first cost rather than life cycle cost purchasing practices, which 
can impede motor system optimization” (McKane, et al., 2007). 
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Barriers in small firms 
A common finding of the studies reviewed was that small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) 
typically face greater obstacles to improving energy efficiency than larger firms. Figure 4.3 provides 
an illustration of the number of mentions of specific barriers in our sample of studies, distinguishing 
between large companies and SMEs.  
 
Figure 4.3  Simple count of the number of mentions of specific barriers to energy efficiency within 
the sample of studies - distinguishing between large companies and SMEs1  
0
10
20
30
Imperfect information
Hidden costs
Access to capital
Split incentives
Bounded rationality
Risk/uncertainty
Large Other
 
 
1
 The ‘Other’ category includes studies focused on SMEs, SME-dominated sectors and studies that cover both large 
companies and SMEs.  
 
The greater difficulties faced by SMEs have a number of origins. First, such firms are less likely to 
have the relevant information about energy efficient opportunities or the skills to implement those 
opportunities. They also face proportionately higher costs in obtaining data on energy consumption 
and costs and comparing this with relevant benchmarks. For many SMEs, energy forms a relatively a 
small portion of the total production costs and management pays little attention to energy efficiency. 
The neglect of cost saving opportunities may well be justified in these circumstances, as the time and 
resources required to identify and implement these opportunities would be greater than the energy 
cost savings achieved. Such firms may also be difficult to target through public policy, owing to their 
diversity and the lack of time, resource and expertise they have to apply to ‘non-core’ issues (Grubb 
and Wilde, 2005). SMEs can also be particularly cautious regarding where they undertake 
investments, as they cannot afford a capital loss. Hence, investment risk, whether arising from 
uncertainty about technical performance, energy prices or some other source, is likely to be a greater 
obstacle – and especially for large projects. 
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In addition, SMEs often face greater difficulties in obtaining capital, particularly in developing 
countries where capital markets are not well developed (Arquit Niederberger and Spalding-Fecher, 
2006). Studies by The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) of SMEs in the Indian foundry and 
glass industries indicated that limited access to capital was the major barrier to energy efficiency 
improvements. Many SMEs working in the glass industry in Firozabad (near Agra) were just barely 
continuing their operations (taking cost inputs and revenue generation into account), and had no way 
of providing the needed capital to make any investments. TERI therefore worked with the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), providing financial and technical assistance for 
these SMEs (Pal, 2006).  
 
Barriers in large, energy-intensive firms  
Large energy-intensive firms have both greater incentives to improve energy efficiency and greater 
capacity to do so. Hence, the obstacles faced by such firms may differ in from those faced by SMEs. 
Recent studies of the cement sector illustrate these issues.  
 
Energy consumption in the production and use of cement makes up a significant proportion of 
operations costs. Efficiency gains have been made over the past few years, partly in response to 
energy price volatility (AHAG, 2008; CSI, 2007). Since further reductions are both more costly and 
relatively less effective, organizational barriers become more influential. In a survey of US cement 
customers, Coito et al. (2005) found that the interviewees rated cost saving measures as a relatively 
unimportant contributor to their company’s success.  
 
"….When asked about the factors considered key to their business, customers all agreed that 
these factors were: environmental regulations, market conditions, and energy costs. However, 
when rating key factors to their company’s success, identifying and implementing cost saving 
measures was low on the list" (pp.9). 
 
In contrast, the reliability and continuous operation of the plant was found to be of the highest 
priority, especially since shutting down a plant to install new efficiency-related equipment could 
jeopardize the integrity of the kilns. This suggests that managers’ decisions on energy efficiency 
improvements reflect their localized assessments of the hidden costs involved.  
 
The scale of energy efficiency projects in the context of other investments is also a significant factor. 
An energy-saving innovation may require operational and housekeeping improvements, incremental 
technological changes, retrofitting, or the introduction of completely new equipment and processes. 
The willingness to pursue these investments may depend on contemporaneous projects in the pipeline 
more than the returns of the individual proposal. For example, one firm indicated that they were 
  
50 
investigating the feasibility of a complete plant overhaul, but uncertainty over this project had halted 
any possible efficiency projects (Coito, et al., 2005). Large scale investment in energy efficiency 
therefore becomes more feasible when incorporated within an existing, strategic program to upgrade 
equipment and processes.  
 
Access to capital also appears an important issue: “…many energy-efficiency improvements in the 
cement industry involve large capital investments for which limited capital was available” (Coito and 
Allen, 2007). However, the studies reviewed fail to provide sufficient analysis of why capital is 
restricted and the extent to which this reflects organizational problems or broader failures in the 
capital market (see Section 3.5). 
 
Lack of information, skills and expertise is generally found to be less important for large, energy-
intensive firms than for SMEs. But studies in the cement sector indicate that while firms have access 
to sufficient information they often have insufficient time to use this information – again highlighting 
the importance of hidden costs. Many firms were aware of the potential of smaller energy efficiency 
projects, but failed to pursue them because they “are not worth the trouble.” and because they were 
preoccupied with “keeping things running” (Coito and Allen, 2007). The following quotation 
illustrates how time constraints and concern about production interruptions can combine:  
 
“.….We have a strong emphasis on energy management. However, maintaining consistent 
production and product quality is the overriding concern. Although everyone at the plant is 
aware of energy and it is a key factor on which operations are based, we have limited operating 
staff. Fine-tuning for optimising efficiency, and developing, championing, and managing 
energy improvements takes staff time that is just not available given each person’s day to day 
responsibility. We do have “special projects “engineering staff, but even they are too busy to 
take on energy projects that aren’t related to maintaining production. Also, the plant must 
remain in production as much as possible. The interruptions and coordination required for 
retrofits can also restrict consideration of energy retrofits.” (Coito and Allen, 2007) 
 
The industry’s flagship voluntary reporting scheme – the Cement Sustainability Initiative –finds that 
the normal operational energy consumption of cement kilns was around 15 percent higher than the 
best performance achievable during commissioning tests - due to factors such as maintenance shut-
downs and start-ups and variations in burning conditions and material humidity (CSI, 2007). While 
improving operational efficiency may be feasible, the hidden costs of monitoring performance and 
investigating and implementing new procedures can often outweigh the financial benefits. The CSI 
report also shows that substantial improvement in the average thermal efficiency of the sector depends 
upon the closure of old and inefficient kilns. While kilns in China, India, Asia Japan, Australia and 
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New Zealand are mostly of the most efficient type (preheater/precalciner ‘dry’ kilns), most of those in 
the CIS are older (‘wet’ kilns) and use up to 80 percent more energy per tonne of clinker produced 
(CSI, 2007). The lag in asset renewal in the CIS reflects the availability of cheap gas, undermining 
cost savings of switching to newer technology. Low energy prices, together with “complex and 
lengthy permitting procedures for new kilns, and lengthy court and appeal procedures" have also 
slowed the adoption of new kiln technology in North America (CSI, 2007). Hence, significant 
improvements in the energy efficiency of this sector will require these broader, market and contextual 
factors to be addressed, rather than internal organizational barriers. Such conclusions are likely to 
apply to many other energy-intensive industries. 
 
Some of these contextual factors will more amenable to policy intervention than others. Where new 
generations of technology offer wider operational benefits, market mechanisms can be effective. For 
example, MNCs are shifting clinker production to Asia to take advantage of lower operating costs of 
dry kiln plants. Procurement policy to stimulate demand may also be effective in some contexts. For 
example, although composite cement is less energy-intensive to produce than the traditional product, 
customers are resistant to try unproven materials: "...there are still markets where cement and concrete 
standards and customer preference constitute a barrier to reducing the clinker-to-cement ratio" (CSI, 
2007). 
 
In sum, large, energy-intensive firms are typically better informed about energy efficiency 
opportunities than SMEs and face fewer difficulties in obtaining capital for investment. However, 
they still face important barriers to improving energy efficiency, most notably in relation to the hidden 
costs of staff time and the risk of production interruptions. The extent to which such problems could 
or should be mitigated through policy intervention is open to question. Nevertheless, the appropriate 
policy approach is likely to a significantly different to that for SMEs. 
 
Contextual issues and policy implications  
Many of the studies in our sample present results based on empirical observation at the level of 
industrial plants and many of these point to the need for more detailed data on the operational 
conditions in which technologies are implemented (Chen, 2007; Coito, et al., 2005; Dupont and 
Sapora, 2009; Erpelding and Moman, 2005; Irrek, et al., 2009; Ruth, et al., 2001). Operations can be 
both highly localized and internally complex, suggesting the need for a system-level perspective to 
understand the energy implications of interactions between processes (Levacher, et al., 2009; 
McKane, et al., 2007; Pye and McKane, 1999). Complexity is also apparent at the macro level, for 
example between energy saving at the process level and the ‘embodied energy’ associated with 
energy efficient products (Irrek, et al., 2009).  
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Success in energy efficiency hinges upon having adequate information about energy consumption and 
energy efficiency opportunities, together with the capacity to use information. The cost to the firm of 
obtaining such information data may constitute an important barrier. Performance labeling of energy-
consuming goods and services is one way for policy to address such problems barriers. Sector 
performance benchmarks may also be effective in directing firms to adopt and achieve energy 
efficiency targets and collate more granular operational data. An integrated approach to overcoming 
informational barriers could also include a public repository of energy efficiency and operational data; 
certification, standardization and training; and an extension of labeling from products to processes 
(AHAG, 2008). But many proposals for overcoming organizational barriers are coalescing around the 
need for formal, standardized approaches to energy management systems (see Box 4.1). (e.g., 
Galitsky, et al., 2003; Helgerud and Sandbakk, 2009; McKane, et al., 2007; Motegi and Watson, 
2005; Wroblewski, et al., 2005). Such systems formalize energy management by establishing 
processes for regular energy audits and co-ordination of energy saving projects (CADDET, 1995). An 
EMS is typically founded on a company-wide energy policy with prominent support from senior 
management, as well as dedicated energy management personnel.  
 
Box 4.1 Addressing internal barriers: Energy management systems and standards 
Several studies contain empirical observation of positive impacts following the adoption of formal Energy 
Management Systems (EMS) (Helgerud and Sandbakk, 2009; Motegi and Watson, 2005; Thollander and 
Ottosson, 2009). Formal approaches are recommended as introducing energy efficiency into ‘business as usual’ 
operations, encouraging the diffusion of best practices and lowering the risk of investment projects (McKane, et 
al., 2008).  
 
This approach is currently being introduced via internationally-coordinated standards. Proposals for an 
Industrial Standards Framework combines energy reduction targets, energy efficiency standards, system 
optimization training, and documenting for sustainability. The aim is to link industrial energy efficiency with 
existing international ISO standards for quality and environmental management (McKane, et al., 2008). The 
proposed Framework incorporates the established structures of ISO 9000 for quality management and ISO 
14000 for environmental management, thereby building on the associated language, processes and culture of 
ISO compliance. The objective is to raise awareness of energy efficiency to the same level of prominence within 
the firm as established operational considerations such as costs, reliability, quality and throughput. By 
promoting a cultural shift within organizations, the benefits of energy management can be understood as 
intrinsically linked to other strategic goals. The Framework is also designed such that firms build internal 
capability through extensive training programs and anticipate the extension of carbon-related regulation by 
introducing transparency into systems for data collection and reporting.  
 
As with the environmental management standard ISO 14001, the firm would commit to targets and an action 
plan that shows the procedures adopted in order to achieve them. However, criticisms have been expressed 
regarding whether the ISO standards-making process is representative of interests in developing countries. A 
second concern is that such standards could amount to trade barriers in some contexts as they require 
compliance that may be costly, and may not deliver the expected environmental benefits (Levy and Newell, 
2005).  
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Highly localized conditions can often present a barrier to effective regulation and to diffusion of best 
practice within a sector. The prevalence of such heterogeneity supports the argument for market-based 
regulatory mechanisms such as carbon pricing to encourage innovation and technology adoption. 
However, many industrial facilities are relatively small energy users in absolute terms and so both fall 
below the size threshold for carbon trading schemes and are relatively unresponsive to changes in 
energy prices. A complementary approach is to introduce trans-national standards that build on 
existing processes and cultural dispositions within firms.  
 
4.2 Findings on barriers to energy efficiency in developing countries 
KOKO of the empirical studies related to firms in developing countries. Most of these stress the fact 
that the barriers to energy efficiency in developing countries are similar to those in industrialized 
nations but typically more pronounced. As indicated in  
Figure 4.2, the most common barriers cited in these studies are imperfect information and access to 
capital.  
 
Imperfect information  
This barrier, as noted earlier, includes insufficient information regarding energy consumption and 
costs, energy efficiency opportunities and/or the relative energy performance of different technical 
options. In most cases, this is linked to time constraints, the cost of obtaining information and the lack 
of adequately trained personnel. While imperfect information is a generic problem, it appears 
particularly pronounced within developing countries and especially within SMEs. In many developing 
countries, there is insufficient capacity within the public sector for information dissemination and 
training which contributes to technical personnel being unfamiliar with energy efficiency 
opportunities and technologies (Worrell, et al., 2001b). Examples of such problems include: 
 
A study of motor systems in China which found that design engineers are “…..specialised in certain 
specific subjects…[and] tend to use existing or old products and equipment and are not aware of the 
latest energy efficient products" (EEPC, 2006). 
 
A survey of 100 investors and users of intelligent motor controllers in China, which found that buyers 
were generally unaware of the energy efficiency potential of intelligent motor controllers (Yang, 
2007). 
 
A study of energy efficiency within Jordan which noted that the lack of awareness of the potential for 
energy savings was a key barrier to efficiency improvements (Arburas, 1989). 
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A study of the Chinese motor market which found that few enterprises were aware of the 
opportunities for reducing energy use through high efficiency equipment and system optimization, 
and those that were aware lacked the expertise to properly optimize their systems (Nadel, et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, the lack of expertise on system optimization within China made it difficult for the 
enterprises to gain appropriate advice. 
 
An earlier study of the same market which found that the three key barriers to energy efficiency were: 
(1) a lack of system optimization information by enterprises and companies that use motors; (2) 
limited availability of energy efficiency experts to provide this information; (3) limited availability of 
printed information and other tools on motor systems benefits and approaches (UNIDO, 2000). 
 
In many developing countries, the problem of lack of information is not confined to end users - many 
producers of end use equipment have little knowledge of energy efficiency opportunities and more 
limited access to the relevant technologies (Worrell, et al., 2001b). In these circumstances, the 
information and knowledge deficits on both the production and demand side of the market can act to 
reinforce each other. 
 
Access to capital  
Studies regarding both large and smaller firms in developing countries underscored the importance of 
access to capital to implement energy efficiency projects and the frequent difficulties in doing so. The 
problem can be particularly pronounced for developing country SMEs where access to capital is 
frequently limited owing to factors such as the higher risk of lending to SMEs, the costs to the lender 
of establishing credit-worthiness, the lack of adequate securities for loans or the deficiencies of the 
domestic financial sector. SMEs typically have less access to international financing and hence rely 
more upon domestic sources of capital which may be less knowledgeable about technical risks and 
opportunities. In addition, the high inflation rates, political instability and corruption in many 
developing countries can increase the risks for domestic and foreign investors while national trade and 
investment policies can limit the inflow of foreign capital and technology. All these difficulties can 
reinforce the bias towards purchasing technologies with low capital cost and high running costs and 
encourage the purchase of inefficient, second-hand equipment (Worrell, et al., 2001b). Our sample 
provided numerous examples of such difficulties, including:  
 
A study of village enterprises in China found they had very limited access to capital because only two 
banks were allowed to have branches in rural areas (Worrell, et al., 2001b). 
 
A study of the iron and steel industry in China found that the cost of capital was very high, so that 
once a firm had made an investment, it was difficult to instigate major changes (Worrell, 1995). This 
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problem was reinforced by the longevity of capital-intensive process technologies in this sector 
(Moors, et al., 2005).  
 
A study of financing for energy efficiency in China found that the government had barred lending to 
steel and cement companies in an attempt to prevent the unbridled expansion of heavy industry 
(Chandler and Gwin, 2007). This effectively blocked a pathway for energy efficiency finance. The 
study also found that numerous rules discouraged foreign direct investment, domestic banks were not 
permitted to lend money at interest rates of more than ~8 percent thereby encouraging them to be risk-
averse, and the limits on the annual growth of loans had undermined the effectiveness of ‘Green 
Loan’ programmes for energy efficiency improvements (Yanjiaa and Chandler, 2009). 
 
A study of the Chinese market for motors in fans, pumps & compressors highlighted the high relative 
cost of imported technology and the lack of access to capital (EEPC, 2006). An earlier study of the 
same market found that enterprises frequently lacked the capital to pay for optimization projects or 
more efficient products while domestic motor and equipment manufacturers lacked capital for 
purchasing equipment and higher quality raw materials that could help improve the efficiency of their 
products (Nadel, et al., 2002). In each case, the difficulty in accessing capital is exacerbated by the 
reliance upon imported technologies. 
 
A study of small breweries in Bolivia found that their profitability and difficulties in accessing finance 
were preventing them from converting to from wood-firing to natural gas from wood (van Oosterhout, 
et al., 2005). 
 
Other barriers  
Developing country studies provide numerous examples of other barriers but few studies attempt to 
evaluate their relative importance. As observed above, the different barriers are commonly 
interdependent and most could be interpreted in a number of ways. Some relevant examples include: 
 
Split incentives: A study of energy efficient motor systems in China noted that the purchasers of 
motors are generally not the end users (Yang, 2007). This creates a conflict between the motivations 
and decision criteria of the purchaser (e.g., to minimize the up-front capital cost) and those who pay 
the energy bill. 
 
Bounded rationality: Numerous studies find that energy efficiency is typically a low priority within 
firms, due to lack of senior management engagement on the issue (Ozturk, 2005; Worrell, et al., 
2001a). Firms frequently exhibit ‘inertia’, meaning they are reluctant to make changes and adopt new 
technologies for a variety of reasons (Clark, 2000). 
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Contextual issues and policy implications 
Many of the studies indicated possible reasons why the barriers faced by developing country firms – 
and especially by SMEs - are more pronounced. These include: the fragmentation of industry and the 
poor links between SMEs and other groups of firms (including foreign-owned subsidiaries); the 
limited availability of relevant knowledge and skills, many of which need to be imported; the 
tendency to rely upon ageing, second-hand equipment; the dominance of family enterprises which can 
frequently restrict access to skills and information; and the reliance upon imported technology, 
combined with the limited capacity to adapt and use that technology.  
 
Of particular importance was the widespread prevalence of subsidized energy (and particularly 
electricity) prices which acts to undermine the economic case for improved energy efficiency (Lohani 
and Azimi, 1992; Park and Labys, 1994).8 While the general view was that subsidized energy prices 
in developing countries served as a barrier to energy efficiency, it is important to point out that these 
barriers can be context, industry and technology-specific. For example, in a study examining the 
effectiveness of an energy efficiency loan program to Indian firms, the majority of firms complained 
about the government’s electricity subsidies to agriculture and low-income households, which led to 
higher electricity prices for industry. The result was to encourage industrial users to generate their 
own electricity using small-scale plants that were less energy efficient than the large centralized plants 
supplying the National Grid (Yang, 2006). 
 
Many developing countries make no coordinated efforts to promote energy efficiency, whether in the 
form of an agency devoted to energy efficiency within the federal government or a division or section 
within their energy ministries. Hence, the problems such as lack of information remain unaddressed. 
However, there are some recent and encouraging examples within this area among the emerging 
economies such as China and India (see Box 4.2). 
                                                 
8
 That said, debates continue regarding the most effective way to address subsidized energy prices. For instance, there has 
been mixed success of the reform of the energy sector of developing countries through privatization (which generally 
recommended a market price for energy). This was the mantra offered in the 1990s / 2000s through the ‘Washington 
consensus’. Although some suggest that its failure was due to governments implementing these recommendations half-
heartedly, others purport that the ‘prescriptions’ offered were too generic, not taking contextual aspects sufficiently into 
account (Ockwell, et al., 2009). 
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Box 4.2 Energy efficiency policies and programmes in China and India 
Energy efficiency is the first priority of China’s energy policy in its 11th Five-Year plan (2006–2010). The 
Chinese government initiated the “1000 enterprises programme”, whose goal is to reduce the emissions of 1000 
large companies by the equivalent of 260 million tonnes of CO2. The firms involved account for one third of 
total Chinese energy consumption total and almost half of industrial energy consumption. Some government 
agencies also have procurement programs requiring energy efficient products.  
 
In June 2008, the Government of India released their National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC). The 
Plan consists of Eight Nations Missions, where India will target its efforts to address climate change. One of 
these, the National Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency (NMEEE), includes four new initiatives, namely: a) 
a market based mechanism to enhance cost-effectiveness of improvements in energy efficiency in energy-
intensive large industries and facilities, through certification of energy savings that could be traded; b) 
accelerating the shift to energy efficient appliances in designated sectors through innovative measures to make 
the products more affordable; c) creating mechanisms that would help finance demand side management (DSM) 
programs in all sectors by capturing future energy savings; and d) developing fiscal instruments to promote 
energy efficiency.  
 
In addition, the Mission also proposes sectoral initiatives, including: a) restructuring of subsidies in the fertilizer 
sector so as to provide adequate incentives to undertake energy efficiency investments; b) promoting technology 
up-gradation in the SME sector by developing sector specific programs for different industry clusters; and c) 
accelerated depreciation and reduced VAT for energy efficient equipment.  
 
The document recognizes the need for technology transfer, financing mechanisms and capacity building and 
especially the knowledge gap that exists in the micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) sector. It proposes 
the development of sector-specific programmes for technology development and adoption in such industries.  
 
The Action Plan is still at an early stage and it remains to be seen how successful it will be. It has a number of 
weaknesses, however, including the lack of detail in certain areas and the neglect of the largest energy 
consumer, namely local and national government.  
 
 
Although less prominent in the sample of studies reviewed, a final theme was the importance of 
technology transfer. This goes beyond simply importing a technology (e.g., a production process) and 
includes improving a firm’s technological capabilities and ‘absorptive capacity’, defined as “…the 
ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Park and Labys, 1994). Studies espousing this view suggest that barriers 
to the adoption do not only rest with lack of information, but also lack of knowledge, understanding 
and capacity.  
 
Technology cooperation can only be successful if it “takes place as part of a wider process of 
technological capacity building” (Ockwell, et al., 2009). In other words, technology cooperation must 
include opportunities for learning, with successful adoption requiring the ability to innovate 
(Douthwaite, 2002). But opportunities for learning are not sufficient to ensure successful cooperation, 
players must also be able to assimilate and make use of this new knowledge (van den Bosch, et al., 
2003). While there is no single agreed upon definition for technological capabilities, a common view 
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holds that they are assets, including human resources, technical and scientific skills and infrastructure, 
held by a firm, region or country that facilitate technological change (Rogers, 2003). Several of the 
studies reviewed highlighted these issues, but captured them as a lack of training, expertise and 
information. However, as indicated above, addressing technological capabilities and absorptive 
capacity are distinct issues, warranting a specific policy response.  
 
Related to this are those studies that highlighted the importance of communication between different 
groups (Rohdin, et al., 2007; Vine, 2005). For instance consultants or energy service companies 
(ESCOs) can be advantageous as they can provide expertise and the time needed to devote to energy 
efficiency issues, but often there is a lack of trust and confidence between industry firms and these 
consultants. As a way of overcoming this trust barrier, one study highlighted a programme from the 
US DOE where university students served as an external resource to provide energy audits to SMEs. 
After being involved with firms for some time, some firms opted to hire the student to have their own 
internal energy efficiency resource (Tonn and Martin, 2000). 
 
5 Summary of findings from a selection of detailed studies 
A number of the studies were especially useful in that they attempted to identify the relative 
importance of different barriers to energy efficiency in different contexts. This was achieved either 
through the econometric analysis of survey data (e.g., Schleich, 2009) or (more usually) from the less 
formal analysis of survey and interview data (e.g., Hasanbeigi, et al., 2009). As with the full sample 
of studies, this subgroup classified barriers in a variety of overlapping and often inconsistent ways, 
with most of them conceptualizing barriers from the viewpoint of the industrial firms rather than 
economic theory. Also, several of the studies are methodologically weak and/or include factors that 
do not qualify as barriers under our definition. Nevertheless, a brief review and comparison of these 
studies can provide some useful insights into the relative importance of different barriers in different 
contexts. The following sections summarize each study in turn. 
 
5.1 Barriers in non-energy-intensive firms in Germany  
One of the few methodologically rigorous studies of this topic is the econometric analysis of 19 
public, commercial and industrial sectors by Schleich and Gruber (2008). This data source for this 
study was a survey of 2848 companies and public sector organizations conducted in 1999 – an 
impressively large sample size for a study of this type (Geiger, et al., 1999). The survey included 
detailed questions on the implementation of energy saving measures, together with perceptions of 
barriers to energy efficiency. Energy costs as a share of total costs was relatively low for all of the 
sectors interviewed, but they nevertheless accounted for around 17 percent of German final energy 
consumption. 
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The organizations were classified as being ‘active’ on energy efficiency if they had adopted at least 50 
percent of the measures that were deemed feasible. This formed the dependent variable (active=1; 
inactive=0) in a Logit model which was estimated separately for each sector. The dependent variables 
include the size of the organization, its annual energy consumption, the split between thermal energy 
and electricity consumption and the responses to questions about barriers to energy efficiency. The 
following barriers were included in the specification, with the text in brackets indicating how they 
map on to our taxonomy. 
 
• Lack of information about energy-efficient measures (imperfect information); 
• Lack of time to analyse energy efficiency potential (hidden costs); 
• Other investment priorities (bounded rationality); 
• Energy costs may vary in the future (risk); 
• Organization space is rented (split incentives). 
 
The main findings were as follows. First, the relative importance of each barrier varied widely from 
one sector to another, but in the majority of cases multiple barriers were found to be statistically 
significant. Second, non-profit sectors experienced the most barriers, while the most energy-intensive 
experienced the least, but the variation in energy costs within sectors made little difference. Third, the 
split incentives barrier – in the classic landlord-tenant form - was statistically significantly more than 
half the sub-sectors, although the majority of these were in the public and commercial sectors rather 
than the industrial sector. Fourth, imperfect information was found to be statistically significant in one 
third of the sectors, but the survey did not allow any inferences to be made about whether this was due 
to inadequate metering or other organizational deficiencies. Also, information problems were less 
important in the industrial sectors, perhaps owing to greater technical expertise. Finally, both risk 
related to future energy prices and hidden costs in the form of time constraints were found to be 
relatively unimportant, with these variables only being statistically significant for two sectors in each 
case.  
 
The relative unimportance of time constraints is a surprising result and conflicts with the findings of 
comparable studies such as Sorrell et al. (2004) (see below). Time constraints may contribute to the 
lack of information on energy efficiency measures since the organizations may lack the time to 
investigate those opportunities. Such a result would appear as a correlation between these two 
independent variables, but in most of the sectors analysed the correlation coefficient was well below 
0.5. 
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5.2 Barriers in Dutch industry 
One of the earliest econometric studies of this topic was by Velthuijsen (1993), who administered a 
survey to 70 Dutch firms from seven industrial sectors, including a mix of small and large firms 
within each sector. All of the firms indicated potential energy efficiency gains, although the reported 
size of these gains was significantly lower than that indicated by energy-economic models. This could 
reflect a lack of knowledge of efficiency opportunities, a more accurate assessment of the hidden 
costs associated with those opportunities or a mixture of the two. The firms were asked to what extent 
they had installed various energy efficient technologies and whether seven potential barriers to energy 
efficiency were relevant to them (either yes or no). Chi-squared tests were then used to assess whether 
‘poor performers; differed from the population in the frequency with which they cited the importance 
of a particular barrier. 
 
The barriers found to be significant were: a) the small size of the energy bill (hidden costs); b) limited 
knowledge (imperfect information); c) non-core business (bounded rationality); d) equipment is not 
scrapped yet; and e) budgetary constraints (access to capital). Four of these map relatively 
straightforwardly onto our taxonomy, while ‘equipment is not scrapped yet’ suggest that the 
investment would be uneconomic. However, the methodology did not allow the relative importance of 
these variables to be assessed, or the determinants of each to be explored in more detail. 
 
A comparably comprehensive study was conducted by de Groot et al (2001) who administered a 15-
page survey to a wide range of Dutch companies. Econometric analysis was used to determine how 
investment behaviour, barriers to investment and responsiveness to policy intervention varied with 
firm characteristics and sector. The sample included 135 firms in the chemicals, metals, machinery, 
food, paper, horticulture, construction and textile industries.  
 
The authors identified three groups of barriers to energy efficiency: general barriers related to the 
overall decision-making process; financing constraints (access to capital); and those related to various 
types of uncertainty (risk). The overall ranking of these barriers is illustrated in Figure 5.1. As with 
other studies, the categories are both ambiguous and difficult to interpret within our framework. 
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Figure 5.1  The relative importance of barriers to energy efficiency in a sample of Dutch firms 
 
Note: Barriers given 5 points if considered ‘very important’ and 1 if considered ‘totally unimportant’. 
 
 
The results show that the most important barrier for firms was the existence of other investment 
opportunities that are either more profitable or considered more important (opportunity cost). Also 
ranked highly was the incomplete depreciation of the existing capital stock and the fact that ‘energy 
costs are not sufficiently important’. Both of these could be taken as implying that hidden costs 
outweigh the energy cost savings. The ‘general’ barriers were ranked more highly than those related 
to access to capital and risk, but the former includes both factors suggesting economically rational 
behaviour (e.g., ‘currently introducing a new technology’) as well as those suggesting organizational 
failures (e.g., ‘difficult to implement due to internal organization’). While the authors conclude that 
the results show a ‘decision-making process that is rational and consistent with cost benefit analysis’ 
the data seems insufficient to demonstrate this is the case. 
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The authors found evidence that sector- and firm-specific factors helped explain investment behaviour 
and attitudes to policy, although the analysis was limited by the number of observations. The most 
important factors were firm size, energy intensity and competitive position. Only a few of the barriers 
were given a significantly different ranking by different sectors, but ‘general’ barriers were less 
important in energy-intensive firms and more important in large firms facing strong competition. 
While the importance of imperfect information was not investigated, the survey found good 
knowledge of energy efficiency opportunities in large firms that invest heavily and are faced with 
strong competition, but less knowledge in small firms facing limited competition and spending 
relatively little on investment. Overall, the results suggest that policies such as information 
programmes should be targeted at particular categories of firm. 
 
5.3 Barriers in the Swedish pulp and paper industry  
Thollander and Ottosson (2008) analysed energy management practices in the Swedish pulp and paper 
industry. The sector was chosen for its high energy intensity, accounting for nearly half of Swedish 
industrial energy use (or ~2 percent of EU-25 industrial energy use). The authors cite studies 
suggesting investments with payback periods of less than two years could reduce electricity 
consumption in this sector by 1-4 percent and heat consumption by 10-15 percent. The sector is very 
capital intensive, using continuous processes that produce paper at speeds of ~100km/h, with a result 
that disruptions to production are costly and changes to the production process can be risky.  
 
Thollander and Ottosson sent a questionnaire to the energy managers of 59 paper mills and received 
40 replies (a 68 percent response rate). The survey contained questions on the relative importance of 
different barriers, using the framework originally developed by Sorrell et al. (2000c). It also examined 
the drivers to improved efficiency, the investment criteria used and the method of energy cost 
allocation. The responses to the question on barriers are summarized in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2  The relative importance of barriers to energy efficiency in the Swedish pulp and 
paper industry 
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Uncertainty regarding the company's future
Cost of staff replacement, retirement, retraining
Difficulties in obtaining information about the energy use of purchased equipment
Energy objectives not integrated into operating, maintenance or purchasing procedures
Poor information quality regarding energy efficiency opportunities
Low priority given to energy management (by the company board)
Lack of sub-metering
Energy manager lacks influence
Lack of technical skills
Cost of identifying opportunities, analyzing cost effectiveness and tendering
Long decision chains
Lack of staff awareness
Other priorities for capital investments
Lack of budget funding
Possible poor performance of equipment 
Slim organization
Lack of access to capital
Lack of time or other priorities
Technology is inappropriate at the mill
Cost of production disruption/hassle/inconvenience
Technical risks such as risk of production disruptions
Barriers to energy efficiency in the Swedish pulp- and paper industry
 
 
Note: Barriers given 1 point if considered of major importance, 0.5 points if sometimes important and zero points if rarely 
important. 
 
The respondents identified the risk of production disruptions as the most important barrier to energy 
efficiency, while the cost of production disruptions/hassle/inconvenience was rated second. Both of 
these could be interpreted in terms of the hidden costs of investment (production disruptions, staff 
time) as well as the risks associated with any new technology that affects the core production process. 
This demonstrates that investments which involve interruptions to the main production process may 
be associated with significant hidden costs and hence may only be viable if the project can be 
completed within the normal scheduled downtime or as part of a larger investment project. This is 
consistent with earlier findings for the cement industry (Section 4.1) and is likely to be a common 
situation in many energy-intensive industries. 
 
The third most important barrier was ‘technology inappropriate at this site’ (heterogeneity) while 
‘lack of time or other priorities’ was found to be the fourth. The latter could again be interpreted in 
terms of hidden costs, although reinforced by the bounded rationality of the decision makers. From 
this perspective, all four of the most important reasons for neglecting opportunities to improve energy 
efficiency in this sector could be interpreted as rational behaviour from the perspective of the firms – 
either because the technology is inappropriate at the site or because the associated (hidden) costs and 
risks of the investment outweigh the potential energy cost savings. However, as in all studies of this 
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type, it remains unclear whether the costs and risks are being accurately assessed and whether there 
may be scope for improvement – for example, in increasing staffing levels to reduce time constraints. 
The same comment applies to the fifth most important barrier, lack of access to capital, since neither 
the reasons for capital restrictions nor their rationality were assessed. 
 
Barriers that appeared relatively unimportant in this sector included imperfect information - for 
example regarding the energy performance of purchased equipment or the opportunities for improved 
efficiency; and split incentives, where the lack of accountability for energy costs was ranked in the 
least important. This is probably because the firms are large with technically competent staff and 
because two thirds of the sample allocate energy costs to departments using low-level sub-metering 
(Thollander and Ottosson, 2009). These features appear likely to be characteristic of many energy-
intensive industries. 
 
5.4 Barriers in the Swedish foundry industry 
Rohdin et al (2007) also draw on the Sorrell et al (2000c) framework in their analysis of barriers in 
the Swedish foundry industry. This is a fairly energy-intensive sector, with the average number of 
employees ranging from 65 for privately owned companies to 113 for group owned companies. The 
Swedish industry is electricity-intensive compared with other European foundries, perhaps as a result 
of the comparatively low electricity prices that existed prior to market liberalization.  
 
Rohdin et al (2007) sent a questionnaire to 20 executives at each of 59 members of the Swedish 
Foundry Association, obtaining a response rate of 47 percent. The respondents claimed that cost 
efficient energy efficiency measures existed at 93 percent of the sites. Their responses to the question 
on barriers are summarized in Figure 5.3. 
  
65 
Figure 5.3  The relative importance of barriers to energy efficiency in the Swedish foundry 
industry 
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Cost of staff replacement, retirement, retraining
Conflicts of interest within the company
Energy manager lacks influence
Dep./workers not accountable for energy costs
Cost of production disruption/hassle/inconvenience
Uncertainty regarding the companies future
Lack of staff awareness
Long decision chains
Slim organization
Energy objectives not integrated into operating, maintenance or pruchasing procedures
Technology is inappropriate at this site
Lack of technical skills
Lack of time or other priorities
Low priority given to energy management
Cost of identifying opportunities, analyzing cost effectiveness and tendering 
Poor information quality regarding energy efficiency opportunities
Lack of sub-metering
Possible poor performance of equipment 
Other priorities for capital investments
Difficulties in obtaining information about the energy consumption of purchased equipment
Lack of budget funding
Technical risks such as risk of production disruptions
Access to capital
 
 
Note: Barriers given 1 point if considered of major importance, 0.5 points if sometimes important and zero points if rarely 
important. 
 
The most notable result from this survey was that limited access to capital was found to be 
significantly more important than the other barriers listed – in notable contrast to the findings for large 
firms in the pulp and paper industry (Section 5). This is not surprising, since over two thirds of the 
sample had experienced negative profits in the last three years. Although this seems likely to make the 
companies more risk averse, uncertainty regarding the future of the firm was not considered a major 
obstacle to efficiency improvements. Also, the firms were reluctant to consider third-party financing 
as a solution to this problem. 
 
The next five barriers were considered of fairly equal importance and were, in descending order, risk 
of production disruptions (hidden costs), lack of budget funding (access to capital), cost of obtaining 
information (hidden costs and imperfect information), competing priorities for capital investment 
(access to capital and/or bounded rationality) and possible poor performance of equipment (risk). 
Oddly, ‘departments not accountable for energy costs’ was considered relatively unimportant, despite 
being a necessary outcome of the ‘the lack of sub-metering’ which was considered an important 
obstacle. 
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The ownership of the company was found to make some difference to the assessed importance of 
different barriers. While access to capital was a dominant issue for all foundries, independent 
companies faced more informational problems while group-owned companies appeared to face more 
constraints as a result of monitoring and control provisions (e.g., long decision chains, lack of budget 
funding). These same provisions may also contribute to the stricter investment criteria (1–3 years 
payback) used by these companies (DeCanio, 1998). 
 
5.5 Barriers in the Thai cement and textile industry  
Hasanbeigi et al. (2009) surveyed six large companies in the Thai cement industry (which is relatively 
energy-intensive) and 28 SMEs in the textile industry (which is not).9 The questionnaire was based on 
six core questions, each with several options for response. The respondents indicated their level of 
agreement with these options on a five point scale. Supplementary interviews were also conducted 
with independent experts, including policy makers, regulators, and energy services companies.  
 
Table 5.1 indicates how the industry respondents and experts perceived the five most important 
barriers to energy efficiency. The text in brackets suggests how these categories map onto our 
taxonomy, but (once again) interpretation is difficult and a number of the categories are ambiguous. 
Also, several of the categories (e.g., lack of enforcement of government regulations) do not constitute 
barriers under our definition. 
                                                 
9
 The authors acknowledge that the textiles sample was biased towards those with a pre-existing interest in energy efficiency 
given that firms were selected from the membership of an industrial energy organization. 
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Table 5.1  Highest ranked barriers to energy efficiency in the Thai cement and textile 
  sectors 
Textile industry Cement industry Experts 
1. Management finds 
production more important  
(bounded rationality) 
1. Management concerns about the 
investment costs of energy efficiency 
measures  
(hidden costs) 
1. Management concerns about other 
matters especially production rather than 
energy efficiency 
(bounded rationality) 
2. Technology will become 
cheaper  
(risk) 
2.Management finds production more 
important  
(bounded rationality) 
2. Lack of financial resources especially 
in SMEs 
(access to capital) 
3. Maybe new technologies 
will not satisfy future standards 
(risk) 
3. Management concerns about time 
required to improve energy efficiency 
(hidden costs) 
3. Lack of top management 
commitment/understanding/vision 
(bounded rationality) 
 
4. Cost of production 
disruption is high  
(hidden costs) 
4. There is a lack of coordination 
between external organizations  
(not relevant) 
4. Lack of information and knowledge in 
companies especially in SMEs 
(imperfect information) 
5. There is a lack of 
coordination between different 
sections within our company  
(split incentives?) 
5. Current installations are 
sufficiently efficient 
(?) 
5. Lack of enforcement of government 
regulations 
(not relevant) 
6. The government does not 
give financial incentives to 
improve energy efficiency  
(not relevant) 
 
6. Lack of coordination between 
different government agencies 
(not relevant) 
 
 
The results show how the perceptions of barriers differ across the three categories of interviewee. In 
the cement industry, the three highest ranked barriers may all be interpreted in terms of hidden costs – 
a key theme being the overriding importance of maintaining production. In contrast, the respondents 
from the textile industry appear more concerned about technical risk – a point that was also 
highlighted in the expert interviews. Despite the fact that the textile firms are much smaller than the 
cement firms, they had a greater concern about lack of coordination between different departments. 
 
The expert interviewees attached more importance to the lack of financial resources (access to 
capital) than did the industrial respondents, especially for SMEs. However, the textile firms (mostly 
SMEs) highlighted this indirectly in asking for financial support for efficiency improvements. The 
expert interviewees were also the only group to highlight the importance of imperfect information. 
Nevertheless, when asked what is required to improve energy efficiency, all three groups gave top 
priority to more information and training. 
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A theme common to all three groups was the low priority given to energy efficiency by top 
management (bounded rationality). This suggests that raising the awareness of top management must 
form a key component of successful energy efficiency policy. 
 
5.6 Barriers in Greek industry 
Sardianou (2008) investigated decision-making on energy efficiency in 50 Greek firms in the metals, 
machinery, food and drink, chemicals, paper and textiles sectors. The survey contained questions on 
the physical and economic characteristics of the firm, energy consumption and costs, investment 
behaviour and routines, knowledge and implementation of energy efficient technologies and 
perceptions of barriers to energy efficiency. The study uses a rather idiosyncratic classification of 
barriers which is not rooted in a clear theoretical framework. Partly as a result of this, the results are 
difficult to interpret. 
 
The results show that knowledge of energy efficiency opportunities did not vary widely between 
sectors, but tended to be greater in large firms, in those with a greater proportion of skilled staff and in 
those that invested more heavily. Of the 21 barriers to energy efficiency listed in the questionnaire, 
the most important were found to be: 
 
• Bureaucratic procedures to get governmental support (does not explain the neglect of cost-
effective opportunities); 
• Increased perceived cost of energy conservation measures (not clear whether this is due to 
hidden costs or some other factor); 
• Limited access to capital (access to capital); 
• Slow rate of return of the investment (not clear whether this is due to hidden costs, overly 
strict investment criteria or some other factor); 
• Financial resources are spent on other investment (bounded rationality); 
• Uncertainty about future energy prices (risk). 
 
Sardianou used probit models to investigate how the survey responses varied between sectors and 
found that sector characteristics influenced the barriers to energy efficiency – and by implication, the 
appropriate policy response. However, the picture was complex and led to few clear 
recommendations. Barriers related to imperfect information were found to be less important for large 
firms (measured by floor area and a number of employees) and those with a more highly qualified 
workforce. Oddly, these firms also considered lack of access to capital to be a more significant 
problem, as did more energy-intensive firms. An important need was identified for investment in 
training and associated diffusion of information in Greek industry. 
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5.7 Barriers in Chinese SMEs 
Shi et al (2008) use a novel analytic hierarchy process (AHP) methodology to explore how different 
stakeholder groups (government, industry and independent experts) perceived and ranked barriers to 
the adoption of ‘cleaner production’ technologies by Chinese SMEs. This sector was chosen because 
of its low level of adoption of such technologies and because of the particular problems it faces, 
including: resistance of key decision-makers, limited skills, difficulties in obtaining technical 
information and limited access to capital (Shi, et al., 2008). 
 
The AHP method reduces complex, multi criteria decisions into a set of pair-wise comparisons that 
are easier for respondents to perform. In this case, the comparisons related to the relative importance 
of different barriers to the adoption of ‘clean’ technologies - including energy-efficient technologies. 
The results were then processed in an algorithm that assigned an appropriate weight to each barrier 
and calculated a rank order. An important objective of the study was to investigate barriers that were 
both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to the firms. A list of 20 ‘specific’ barriers were identified and grouped 
into four categories, namely: policy and market; financial and economic; technical and information; 
and managerial and organizational (Figure 5.4.). The survey was circulated to 300 stakeholders, of 
which 119 responded, but only 65 passed a consistency test. 
 
Figure 5.4  Categorization of barriers to energy efficiency used in the study of Chinese  
 SMEs 
 
Source: Shi et al (2008) 
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The respondents considered the policy and market barriers to be the most important (normalized 
global weight of 0.347), followed closely by financial and economic barriers (0.334). The aggregate 
weights assigned to the other two categories (technical and information and managerial and 
organization) were less than half of those assigned to the first tow. The authors labelled the two 
prominent categories as being ‘external’ to SMEs and the two less prominent categories as being 
‘internal’, but this distinction is problematic. At the level of individual barriers, the six most 
prominent were:  
 
• lack of economic incentive policies (0.099);  
• lack of environmental enforcement (0.095);  
• high initial capital cost (0.082); 
• poor financial performance of technology (0.076); 
• Difficulties in accessing capital (0.067); 
• Weak public awareness and pressure (0.057). 
 
Three of these (1, 2 and 6) fail to explain the neglect of cost-effective opportunities, but may be of 
greater relevance to ‘clean technologies’ more generally, the adoption of which is more dependent 
upon government regulation. The latter comment also applies to the fourth and possibly the third 
barrier on the list, while the fifth highlights the difficulties faced by SMEs in accessing capital. Hence, 
from the perspective of cost-effective energy efficiency opportunities, access to capital appears the 
most prominent barrier for Chinese SMEs, while from the perspective of clean technologies more 
broadly, wider range of considerations apply. 
 
The stakeholder groups were broadly consistent in their ranking of barriers, with the differences 
perhaps reflecting their different expertise and focus. For example, the experts gave greater weight to 
‘policy’ barriers while industry itself gave greater weight to ‘financial’ barriers. Interestingly, none of 
the groups placed a high importance on the lack of information and awareness, suggesting a policy 
focus on capital markets and investment subsidies may be more appropriate. 
 
5.8 Barriers in the brewing and mechanical engineering sectors in Ireland, Germany 
and the UK 
Sorrell et al (2004) remains the most in-depth and comprehensive investigation of barriers to energy 
efficiency and their approach has since been adopted by a number of other authors (e.g., Masselink, 
2007). The project involved detailed case studies of energy management practices in 48 organizations 
in the brewing, mechanical engineering and higher education sectors in Ireland, the UK and Germany. 
Each case study involved detailed interviews with several employees, supplemented by postal 
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surveys, documentary analysis and interviews with sector experts. The focus was the decision making 
procedures relevant to energy efficiency and the reasons for the neglect of energy efficiency 
opportunities. The potential barriers to energy efficiency were classified as described in Section 2. 
 
Interviewees confirmed the existence of an ‘energy gap’, with the majority of case study 
organizations, identifying cost-effective measures with very short payback periods that were routinely 
passed over. The ‘gap’ was found to be somewhat smaller in the brewing sector which is more 
energy-intensive and hence has a greater incentive to improve efficiency. For each sector in each 
country, the individual barriers to energy efficiency were classified as either of high, medium or low 
importance. The results are summarized in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.2 Barriers considered to be of high importance in the brewing and mechanical 
  engineering sectors in Germany, Ireland and the UK 
Barrier Brewing Mechanical 
Engineering 
Total 
Hidden costs U G I U G I 6 
Access to capital U G I U G I 6 
Imperfect information U G I 3 
Risk U G  U G 4 
Split incentives U G  2 
Note: U= UK case studies; G = German case studies; I = Irish case studies 
 
 
Table 5.3  Specific instances of barriers considered to be of high importance the brewing and 
mechanical engineering sectors in Germany, Ireland and the UK  
Barrier Specific instance Brew Mech 
Hidden costs Overhead costs of energy management U G I U G I 
 Cost of gathering information, identifying opportunities, 
etc. 
 G I 
 Cost of production disruptions U  
 Loss of utility  G  
Access to capital Capital budgeting procedures within the organization U I U G I 
 Availability of capital to the organization U G I  U 
Imperfect 
information 
Lack of information on organizational energy use U G I 
 Lack of information on energy efficiency opportunities  G I  
Split incentives Equipment purchasers not accountable for energy costs U G  
Risk Business risk U G  U  
 Technical risk associated with energy efficient 
technologies 
U G   
Note: U= UK case studies; G = German case studies; I = Irish case studies 
 
Sorrell et al found that problems associated with hidden costs and access to capital was the primary 
reason for not investing in energy efficiency. But in general, hidden transaction costs appeared to be 
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significantly more important than either hidden production costs or loss of utility (see Table 3.3). The 
costs associated with lost production only appeared relevant for a subset of energy efficiency 
opportunities in the brewing sector, while examples of the hidden benefits of energy efficiency 
technologies greatly outnumbered examples of the loss of utility associated with such technologies.  
 
The hidden cost that appeared by far the most important was the overhead costs of energy 
management, including the cost of employing skilled energy management staff. These costs proved 
difficult to quantify, but strong evidence of their importance was provided by the severe time 
constraints on survey respondents and interviewees in all the case study sectors. These constraints 
applied to all sizes of organization, but were particularly evident for smaller mechanical engineering 
firms. Interviewees emphasized how time constraints were the primary reason they were unable to 
keep up to date with technical information, identify energy efficiency opportunities and implement 
energy efficiency projects. In most cases, time constraints were considered more important than 
capital constraints – ‘if we had more money, we wouldn’t have time to spend it!’. 
 
While it proved hard to judge whether individual organizations were allocating sufficient staff time, 
three points were clear. First, most of the case study organizations appeared to be allocating 
significantly less staff time than is recommended in best practice publications (i.e. one full-time 
energy manager for each £1 million of annual utilities expenditure); second, the staff time devoted to 
energy management varied widely between organizations of comparable size in the same sector with 
comparable opportunities to improve energy efficiency; and third, the costs and benefits of staff cuts – 
including lost opportunities from improved energy efficiency – did not appear to have been 
adequately assessed. Since most of the case study organizations had not conducted comprehensive 
energy audits, they lacked relevant information on what these costs and benefits were. Furthermore, 
where energy management staff had access to this information, it was rarely communicated 
effectively to senior management who generally lacked interest in energy issues. As a result, the latter 
remained ignorant of the cost saving opportunities that were available. 
 
Problems with access to capital applied at two levels: insufficient capital through internal funds 
combined with the reluctance to raise additional funds through borrowing or share issues; and the low 
priority given to energy efficiency within internal capital budgeting procedures. The first of these 
applied to practically all the case study organizations and derived in part from the difficult business 
situation faced by many. For example, the brewing industry was facing declining demand, 
overcapacity, increased competition and reduced margins and was responding with cost cutting 
drives, staff reductions and site closures. The net result was a shortage of internal funds for capital 
investment which was then restricted further by priority setting within internal capital budgeting 
procedures, coupled with rigid budgeting rules which make it difficult to transfer funds from one area 
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to another. Since energy costs were small and energy efficiency projects could be postponed, they 
typically fell to the bottom of the priority list. Management attention was focused instead on strategic 
areas such as expansion of production, or on non-discretionary projects such as essential replacement 
of equipment. 
 
Capital rationing was implemented through both strict limits on capital budgets and stringent 
investment criteria, although the first of these appeared more important. Very few organizations came 
near the best practice recommendations of a dedicated energy efficiency budget equal to 5 percent of 
the annual expenditure on utilities and the majority had no such budget at all. In contrast, while 
investment criteria were strict, they were often chosen by the engineering department itself, rather 
than being imposed by senior management. It was repeatedly emphasized that the majority of energy 
efficiency improvements resulted from new or replacement investments undertaken for reasons other 
than reducing energy costs, so an overemphasis on dedicated energy efficiency projects would be 
inappropriate. Similarly, it was generally the case that additional investment could not be undertaken 
without further staff resources to implement those projects. Hence, the results suggested that that 
capital constraints – whatever their origin – were largely secondary to hidden costs in inhibiting 
energy efficiency improvements in these sectors.  
 
5.9 Summary  
A number of factors make it difficult to draw general conclusions from these studies, including the 
range of methodological approaches used, the diversity of approaches to classifying barriers and the 
interdependence between these categories. For example, the opportunity costs identified by de Groot 
in 2001 may be interpreted as an information problem (lack of awareness of potential benefits) or a 
hidden cost (more apparent to managers than to external analysis). The notion of relative importance 
is itself open to interpretation, such as whether this applies at the level of the firm or the sector.  
 
Most of the studies take just one response to a survey question as encapsulating the barriers 
experienced for the firm as a whole. The results are therefore contingent upon the phrasing of the 
question and the perspective of the respondent, including their position within the company. The main 
exception is Sorrell et al who conduct multiple interviews in each case study organization and hence 
are better able to distinguish organizational barriers (such as those between functional departments) as 
well as obtaining greater insight into the nature of each barrier (such as what form the constraints on 
capital take and why this is the case). The tendency for barriers to interact and thereby reinforce each 
other is also difficult to capture within a survey and requires a more qualitative approach. 
 
Nevertheless, it is possible to establish the two ‘most important’ barriers identified by each study and 
these are summarized in Table 5.4. This analysis shows that hidden costs (in various forms) and 
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difficulties in access to capital are the most common explanations for the energy efficiency gap. The 
(hidden) overhead costs of energy management – as reflected in the time constraints on staff - appear 
to be an important issue for the majority of firms, while the risk and cost of production disruptions are 
important for energy-intensive firms. Difficulties in accessing capital appear of greater importance for 
SMEs. Several studies take the prevalence of hidden costs as indicating that the firms are behaving 
rationally in neglecting energy efficiency opportunities. But since this is difficult to demonstrate, the 
conclusion is as much ideological as it is empirical. 
 
Two other conclusions from these studies are that: first, multiple barriers typically coexist and 
reinforce one another; and second, contextual factors matter a great deal, including the operation of 
capital markets and the extent of government promotion of energy efficiency. Difficulties with the 
former and the relative absence of the latter are a particular focus of concern in developing countries. 
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Table  5.4   Summary of findings from the detailed studies  
Study  Method  Key barriers  Comments  
German SMEs Econometri
c analysis 
of survey 
(n=2848)  
1. Imperfect 
information 
2. Split incentives 
Most firms were SMEs and were not energy-intensive. 
Multiple barriers coexist, with significant variation between sectors  
Dutch industry Survey 
(n=135)  
1. Hidden costs  Investment behaviour influenced by firm size, energy intensity and competitive position 
Authors conclude that decision making is rational and consistent with cost-benefit analysis  
Swedish pulp 
and paper 
industry  
Survey 
(n=40)  
1. Hidden costs  
2. Risk  
Large, energy-intensive firms  
Risk of production disruptions of particular importance. Neglect of opportunities may largely 
because technology inappropriate or hidden costs outweigh benefits  
Swedish foundry 
industry  
Survey 
(n=28)  
1. Access to capital  
2. Hidden costs  
Small, energy-intensive firms facing economic difficulties  
Monitoring and control problems with group-owned companies 
Thai cement and 
textile industry 
Survey 
(n=6 for 
cement, 28 
for textiles)  
1. Hidden costs  
2. Risk / Access to 
capital  
Cement firms large and energy-intensive while textile firms small and non energy-intensive  
Hidden costs (especially production disruption) more important for cement.  
Risk and access to capital more important for textiles  
Greek industry 
 
Survey 
(n=50)  
1. Hidden costs  
2. Access to capital  
Significant variation between sectors and size of firm. Information problems less significant for 
large firms  
Chinese SMEs AHP 
analysis of 
survey 
(n=65)  
1. Access to capital  Contextual factors important  
Brewing and 
mechanical 
engineering  
Case-
studies 
(n=48)  
1. Hidden costs  
2. Access to capital  
Brewing firms have medium energy-intensity, while engineering firms have low energy intensity  
Most important barrier was the (hidden) overhead costs of energy management, as reflected in 
the severe time constraints on staff.  
Capital constraints had numerous sources and were largely secondary. 
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6 Main findings 
The main findings from this study are as follows: 
 
Hidden costs are real, significant and form the primary explanation for the ‘efficiency gap’ 
Barriers to energy efficiency are understood, classified and interpreted in multiple ways and the lack 
of both rigour and consistency in the empirical literature makes it difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, 
many of the identified barriers can be understood as ‘hidden costs’ - that is, costs that are only poorly 
captured by energy-economic models. These include, for example, the costs associate of maintaining 
energy information systems, conducting energy audits and distinguishing between efficient and 
inefficient products. These hidden costs frequently outweigh the potential saving in energy costs - 
especially in SMEs with low energy intensity – and thereby form the primary explanation of the 
efficiency gap. What remains in dispute is the extent to which such costs may be cost-effectively 
reduced by organizational initiatives, public policy or a combination of the two. While hidden costs 
are inherently difficult to investigate, much of the existing research is of poor quality and our 
understanding of hidden costs remains poor. Future research needs to be better informed by economic 
theory, employ more rigorous methodologies and investigate new approaches, such as comparative 
studies of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ performers that seek to explain the reasons for success. 
 
The neglect of energy efficiency opportunities is overdetermined 
Hidden costs generally coexist alongside one or more of the other barriers in our taxonomy. For 
example, lack of information pervades energy service markets and senior management in industry is 
frequently unaware of the opportunities available. This coexistence of multiple barriers has a 
cumulative effect, with the result that the neglect of energy efficiency opportunities becomes 
overdetermined. This implies that efforts to remove one barrier may only be partially successful if 
other barriers remain. For example, individual departments could be made accountable for energy 
costs through investment in submetering and energy information systems, combined with changes in 
budgeting procedures. But if the departments lack the skills, information or capital to respond to these 
incentives, or if time-constrained individuals have more pressing priorities, the net effect may be very 
limited. Hence, the key issue is not so much the relative importance of different barriers, but their 
cumulative effect. Initiatives to encourage cost-effective investments will need to understand and 
address several aspects of the problem if they are to be successful. 
 
Barriers to energy efficiency in developing countries are similar to those in developed countries, 
but more pronounced. 
Problems of lack of information and skills are widespread in developing countries and inadequately 
addressed through public policy, while difficulties in accessing capital are very common, especially 
for smaller firms. What this is partly a consequence of hidden costs (e.g., the cost to the lender in 
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establishing credit worthiness), it tends to be exacerbated by the deficiencies of the financial sector in 
many developing countries, including more limited knowledge of technical risks and opportunities 
combined with trade and investment policies that restrict access to foreign capital. These problems 
should be a priority for reform, alongside the removal of energy subsidies which undermine economic 
case for improved energy efficiency. 
 
A targeted policy mix is required 
Barriers to energy efficiency are multi-faceted, diverse and often specific to individual technologies 
and sectors. This implies that effective policy solutions will need to address the particular features of 
individual energy service markets, the circumstances of different types of energy-using organization, 
and the multiple barriers to energy efficiency within each. As a result, it is likely that a policy mix will 
be required, in which several different initiatives work together in synergy. For example, while carbon 
taxes may create price incentives to improve energy efficiency, the response will be muted in many 
sectors unless steps are taken to lower transaction costs. Conversely, if such steps are not taken, 
carbon pricing may need to be unacceptably high to have a significant impact on energy demand. The 
basic elements of this mix are well established in developed countries and include best practice 
schemes, demonstration projects, training initiatives, market-based instruments, labelling schemes and 
minimum standards for the energy efficiency of equipment.  
 
The costs and benefits of these individual instruments will require careful analysis, as will the overall 
coherence the policy mix. To date researchers have paid too much attention to modelling what could 
be achieved and too little attention to evaluating what policy has (or has not) achieved - and why. 
While the required methodologies are well established, applications to energy efficiency policies are 
relatively rare (Frondel and Schmidt, 2001; Meyer, 1995; Sorrell, 2005; Train, 1994). Perhaps the 
most intensively studied area is utility demand-side management (DSM) programmes in the US, 
where some of the better studies suggest that energy savings are significantly overestimated and costs 
underestimated (Joskow and Marron, 1992; Loughran and Kulick, 2004). However, in a 
comprehensive review, Gillingham et al. (2006) concluded that DSM programmes appeared to be 
cost-effective, although concerns remained about hidden costs for consumers. Also, the ‘free-rider’ 
effect was in part balanced by ‘free-driver’ effects and some of the better designed programmes 
performed significantly better than the average. Gillingham et al. also concluded that US appliance 
standards were cost-effective, and would remain so even if the hidden costs were equal to those 
included in the evaluation. Such ex-post evaluations should be a priority for future research. 
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